Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

By Marco Battaglini. 2002

571 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b955534062f960951db98c879f7672cc6fc00a2

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Citations in the corpus

INTEREST GROUPS, INCENTIVES TO COOPERATION AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2006, methodology): “There are several extensions to Crawford and Sobel’s analysis (see for example, Farrell and Rabin (1996), Krishna and Morgan (2001), Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and Battaglini (2002).”
On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment (2004, background): “…a con ict with the receiver only on the x axis and that sender 2 has a con ict with the receiver only on the y axis: In the equilibrium proposed in Battaglini (2002), each sender reveals one dimension of s; about which he has an agreement with the 12It can also be shown that it is important that…”
Information Aggregation in Polls (2008, background): “…on the communication game (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987 and 1989; Krishna and Morgan 2001a and 2001b; Ottaviani and Sorensen 2001; and Battaglini 2002); other work has considered the e¤ect of multiple experts but with noisy information (e.g., Austen-Smith 1993; Li, Rosen, and Suen…”
Deliberation and Voting Rules (2005, background): “Examples include Battaglini [ 6 ], Glazer and Rubinstein [24], Ottaviani and Sorensen [35], Krishna and Morgan [28], Diermeier and Feddersen [12], Lipman and Seppi [30], Matthews and Postlewaite [31], and Austen-Smith [4, 5]. Condorcet surely felt this to be significant when claiming that the second”
How does honest costly signaling work (2014, background): “Alignment of interest models may often be referred to as examples of “cheap talk” (especially outside of biology, see, e.g., Farrell and Gibbons 1989; Battaglini 2002; Ambrus and Takahashi 2008) as there is often no need for a cost function to be associated with the signal as a requirement of…”
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments (2001, background): “Battaglini (2000) studies two-sender cheap talk models in which the underlying uncertainty may be multidimensional.”
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces (2008, background): “E (θ |θ / ∈D(1)) = E (θ )−E (θ : D(1)) 1−P(D(1))”
Authority and Communication in Organizations (2002, background): “Other recent papers are Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), Battaglini (2001), and Krishna and Morgan (2001).”
Pandering to Persuade (2013, background): “Within the small but growing literature on multidimensional cheap talk (e.g., Battaglini, 2002; Ambrus and Takahashi, 2008; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2009), the most relevant comparison is with Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007).”
Reputational cheap talk (2006, background): “Can competition between experts affect the amount of information credibly communicated? For instance, full information revelation results in equilibrium when consulting simultaneously multiple perfectly informed experts in the partisan cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), as shown by Krish”