Competitive Procurement with Corruption

By Roberto Burguet, Yeon-Koo Che. 2004

257 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/24fc8d7c857eaf374147f081ae0a3f2809e68651

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Anne Yvrande-Billon
2. Olivier Compte
3. Thierry Verdier
4. Peter G. Klein
5. Guido Tabellini
6. N. J. Foss
7. Daron Acemoglu
8. Elias Papaioannou

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Anne Yvrande-Billon
2. Olivier Compte
3. Peter G. Klein
4. N. J. Foss

In Strategy and Management

1. Thierry Verdier

Citations in the corpus

• Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions (2005, background): “The work most closely connected to ours is that of Burguet and Che (2004) who analyze a game where bidders simultaneously compete in prices, quality, and bribes.”
• Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London (2009, background): “…other words, the inefficiency cost of corruption increases with the auctioneer’s discretionary power, whether corruption translates into favouritism as in Burguet and Che (2004) or whether it results in making collusion sustainable as in Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006) or Compte et al. (2005).”