Louis Putterman

Safety Research · 2001–2017

A researcher in the Science corpus: 17 papers; trusts 56 researchers and is trusted by 57 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Safety Research — 129 citations into it; #192 of 5,829 by trust here, #213 by citations
• Sociology and Political Science — 95 citations into it; #1,940 of 22,756 by trust here, #1,269 by citations
• Economics and Econometrics — 68 citations into it; #5,625 of 23,481 by trust here, #3,694 by citations
• Demography — 62 citations into it; #238 of 4,236 by trust here, #219 by citations
• General Decision Sciences — 31 citations into it; #265 of 1,995 by trust here, #222 by citations
• Cognitive Neuroscience — 18 citations into it; #4,019 of 10,852 by trust here, #4,616 by citations
• Experimental and Cognitive Psychology — 13 citations into it
• Gender Studies — 10 citations into it

Whom Louis Putterman trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Ernst Fehr
2. Daron Acemoglu
3. Simon Gächter
4. Oded Galor
5. Simon Johnson
6. James A. Robinson
7. Talbot Page
8. D. Weil
9. A. Maddison
10. Christina M. Fong

Who trusts Louis Putterman overall

1. Avner Ben-Ner
2. Ananish Chaudhuri
3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
4. Nikos Nikiforakis
5. Simon Gächter
6. Pelle Ahlerup
7. F. Halldórsson
8. Matthias M. Cinyabuguma
9. Charles N. Noussair
10. S. Gaechter

Papers from Louis Putterman's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Louis Putterman trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
2. Altruistic punishment in humans (Nature)
3. Trust, Risk and Betrayal
4. How to identify trust and reciprocity (Games Econ. Behav.)
5. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism (Nature)
6. The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods
7. Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games
8. THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
9. Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution
10. Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. (Journal of Theoretical Biology)

Their papers

• States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start (2001) — 565 citations
• The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation (2007) — 171 citations
• Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment? (2006) — 240 citations
• Preferences For Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study (2014) — 359 citations
• Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game (2004) — 246 citations
• Share and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving (2004) — 262 citations
• Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem (2009) — 232 citations
• Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment (2005) — 335 citations
• Agriculture, Diffusion and Development: Ripple Effects of the Neolithic Revolution (2008) — 200 citations
• Soft budget constraints, social burdens, and labor redundancy in China's state industry (2003) — 179 citations
• Trust, communication and contracts: An experiment (2009) — 157 citations
• State history and economic development: evidence from six millennia (2017) — 156 citations
• Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011) — 160 citations
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism (2006) — 330 citations
• Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments (2006) — 650 citations
• Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency (2005) — 397 citations
• Trusting and trustworthiness (2001) — 114 citations