Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
By Matthias M. Cinyabuguma, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman. 2005
335 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9160c8b5b7e3a52bae438d1d8df3c575a0ed708a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- S. Gaechter
- David G. Rand
- W. Gueth
- Matthias Sutter
- Maria Vittoria Levati
- Louis Putterman
- Nicholas A. Christakis
In Economics and Econometrics
- Matthias Sutter
- Maria Vittoria Levati
- E. Heijden
- David G. Rand
- Umut Öneş
- Louis Putterman
- W. Gueth
- Nicholas A. Christakis
In Safety Research
- Matthias Sutter
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Nicholas A. Christakis
- Samuel Arbesman
- S. Gaechter
- David G. Rand
- E. Heijden
- Maria Vittoria Levati
Citations in the corpus
- Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “Lf-treatment, where groups with leaders contribute on average 15.6, compared to 3.6 if there is no leader. Columns [4] and [ 5 ] in Table 6 show the”
- Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “…of participants are higher with either monetary or non- monetary punishments compared to the baseline situation where no sanctions are available.29 Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) look at punishment from a different perspective by allowing group members the opportunity to expel free-riders by…”
- Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans (2011, background): “Another form of punishment which has been shown to promote cooperation effectively is ostracism (56, 57).”
- Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, background): “Experiments have shown that this result can be overturned if targeted punishment of free riders is possible (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000) or if the free riders are excluded from the group (Gächter and Thöni 2005 – see section 3.3; Cinyabuguma et al. 2005).”
- The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation (2007, background): “45 In a sense, this is exactly what societies do when they consign their most anti-social individuals to prisons! For an experiment in which free riders are ejected from the main body of subjects leading to highly cooperative performance by those who remain, see Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) .”