Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem

By Arhan S. Ertan, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman. 2009

232 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91619436dfb9b02514bd3226d532e5e7d295d2a9

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Citations in the corpus

Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, background): “Both Decker et al. (2003) and Ertan et al. (2009) do not compare their endogenous treatments with behaviour under identical, but exogenously imposed institutions, as we will do.”
Voting on Punishment Systems Within a Heterogeneous Group (2011, methodology): “They include In this paper, we consider whether two key results of Ertan et al (2009) apply to a setting in which heterogeneity of group members’ productivity, as expressed in the marginal-per-capita return of their contributions, exists.”
Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011, unknown): “…be enforced (in what he terms “the state of nature”) by informal sanctions, but he too concludes that sanctioning should be the job of the state due to the problem of retaliatory punishment: 4 Although they study an informal sanctions context, the results in Ertan et al. (2009) are suggestive here.”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Ertan et al. (2009) allow their participants to vote on who should be punished— those who contribute less than, equal to or greater than the group average contribution.”
Organ donation in the lab: Preferences and votes on the priority rule (2016, methodology): “Table 3: Willingness to donate, Probit regression P(registration= 1) Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)”
Culture and Institutions (2015, unknown): “For more on the relationship between kinship groups and economic outcomes, see La Ferrara and Milazzo (2011) on how kinship differences in inheritance rules can affect economic outcomes; Fafchamps (2000) and Fisman (2003) on how belonging to the same clan affects access to credit; Luke-Munshi (2006)”