Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism

By Christopher M. Anderson, Louis Putterman. Games Econ. Behav., 2006

330 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5a245db418d09467a38bcd5d07ddca4ba174c92d

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Citations in the corpus

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “While Anderson and Putterman (2006) suggest that the demand for punishments may be elastic, Carpenter concludes that, after controlling for issues such as how far below the group average a particular participant’s contribution is, the demand for punishment is inelastic: a 10% increase in the price…”
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009, neutral): “The success of informal sanctioning in supporting cooperative behavior has been shown to depend on the costs and effectiveness of the sanctioning (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2006; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Sutter et al., 2008), the”
Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect (2008, background): “phenomenon (Anderson and Putterman, 2004; Carpenter, 2004; and for a critical view see van Winden, 2001).”
Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, neutral): “Subjects arrive at experiments equipped with norms, which include contextually specific beliefs (expectations of others behavior) and preferences, and then face novel situations (Anderson and Putterman 2006; Ones and Putterman 2007; Putterman n.d.).”
Norm Enforcement in the City: A Natural Field Experiment (2012, background): “A number of experimental studies have shown that as the cost of punishment increases, the willingness to punish declines (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Egas and Riedl, 2007; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008).”
The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods (2006, background): “Over the past several years, the literature has produced several other studies designed to examine the use of rewards or sanctions in public goods settings or other dilemma settings, including Anderson and Putterman (2006); Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003); Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2006”
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? (2008, neutral): “In that case, Nation A will violate the treaty.3 2See for example Anderson and Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006), Carpenter (2005, 2007), Masclet et al. (2003), Nikiforakis and Normann (2007), Nikiforakis et al. (2007), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005).”
Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward) (2011, neutral): “…1964) even with imperfect monitoring of each others’ price and quantity decisions (Green & Porter 1984; Abreu, Pearce & Stacchetti 1986). demand (Anderson & Putterman 2006), subjects in Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher’s (2005) experiment punish defectors more than cooperators even when it is more…”