Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games
By E. Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Vernon L. Smith. 2000
1,312 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb8f19af1f60a9e11025e18f27d485c9ac7ef57d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Gary Charness
- John A. List
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- Simon Gächter
- René Bekkers
- Ernst Fehr
- Robert J. Oxoby
- Nikos Nikiforakis
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- John A. List
- Simon Gächter
- Gary Charness
- Armin Falk
- Urs Fischbacher
- Steven D. Levitt
- Magnus Johannesson
In Sociology and Political Science
- Ernst Fehr
- René Bekkers
- John A. List
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Simon Gächter
- David G. Rand
- James Andreoni
- Samuel Bowles
Citations in the corpus
- A theory of sequential reciprocity (2004, background): “For example, in the case of Dictator games the evidence reported by Hoffman et al. (1996) suggests that “social distance” is important in that context, and Kirchsteiger et al.”
- Testing guilt aversion (2010, background): “The first experiment is a double-blind dictator game, in which neither other subjects nor the experimenters can observe the decision of a particular subject (Hoffman et al., 1994,1996).”
- Examining the role of fairness in high stakes allocation decisions (2008, neutral): “For example, our data are in large part consistent with the data reported in, for example, Hoffman et al. (1996), Eckel and Grossman (1996), and Bohnet and Frey (1999), as we find that rates of positive offers, equal splits, and average positive offers are in the range of 50 percent, 20 percent,…”
- Indirect Reciprocity in Cyclical Networks - An Experimental Study - (2005, background): “Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996), e.g., claim there is less rewarding in double-blind dictator experiments.”
- Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context : A Field Experiment in 30 Churches (2005, background): “In line with this, Hoffman et al. (1996) find that in experimental dictator games offers are lowered as the social distance between the experimental subjects and the experimental leader increases.”
- Norm Enforcement in the City: A Natural Field Experiment (2012, background): “As is well known from economic and psychology experiments, both factors can significantly affect participants' behavior (e.g., Benson, 2000; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996).”
- A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games (2015, background): “Holt and Laury (2002) elicit risk preferences in a similar fashion and eport 19.9 percent of the subjects exhibited non-unique switching behavior. student dummy in the trust regression, and the measure of risk aversion does not have a significant effect on behavior.”
- Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games (2003, background): “The number of self-interested offers with the double-blind protocol is much larger than with single-blind payoffs(Hoffman et al., 1996).”
- Anonymity in the Dictator Game Revisited (2012, methodology): “…2001; Cherry et al., 2002; List and Cherry, 2008; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008), when there is a large social distance between proposers and recipients (Hoffman et al., 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Rankin, 2006; Charness and Gneezy, 2008), when recipients are poor (BranasGarza, 2006; Aguiar et…”