THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

By Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. 2001

12,269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38d738717bcd4618a107bf564e68ae3e495d99d1

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Citations in the corpus

De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence (2006, background): “Institutional persistence, in this context, refers to the persistence of a cluster of economic institutions, such as the extent of enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of society (Acemoglu et al., 2001).”
The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita (2010, neutral): “1See for example Coatsworth, 2005; Glaeser et al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Sachs, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997.”
Inequality, Democracy, and Institutions: A Critical Review of Recent Research (2010, neutral): “As explained in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), the interest of the colonial administrators—who were often relying on indigenous intermediaries—and post-colonial power was often predatory in many countries.”
Institutions and Development: The Interaction Between Trade Regime and Political System (2005, background): “ Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that a high settler mortality rate in the 19th century discouraged settlements and thus has led colonizers to set up “extracting states” while introducing property rights legislation in regions which have been more favorable to settlement.”
Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance: An Overview (2004, neutral): “Tests of the long-run effects of institutions include Hall and Jones (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) .”
Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing revenue or minimizing effort? (2011, background): “Acemoglu et al. (2001) have argued that without significant European settlement, colonial governments were not committed to the development of growth-promoting institutions.”
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids (2013, background): “or governed by foreigners was likely to have had a long-term impact on the development of local market and legal institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001).”
New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development (2010, neutral): “In the models of Olson (1982), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005), Grossman and Helpman (1996 and 2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), they argue that government intervention and institutional distortions arise from the capture of government by powerful vested-interest élites.”
Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation (2002, background): “…in the economics of institutions, growth, and development [see, e.g., Robert J. Barro (1991), Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik (1994), Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995), Daron Acemoglu et al. (1999), Stanley Engerman et al. (1999), and Michael R. Carter and Frederick J. Zimmerman (2000)].”
Risk, Cooperation and the Economic origins of social Trust: an empirical Investigation (2009, neutral): “Previous research has documented that the environment can influence economic performance directly, through its effect on health and agricultural productivity (Landes, 1998; Sachs and Malaney, 2002), and indirectly, by setting the conditions in which sociopolitical institutions have formed (Sokoloff ”
The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is Taking the Con Out of Econometrics (2010, positive): “The paper by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) has stimulated promising research on the sources of economic growth using a similar style.”
Democracy and Globalization (2008, positive): “Acemoglu et al. (2001) argued that settler mortality, which depended in part on geographical location, shaped the development of a colony’s sociopolitical institutions (including, presumably, the extent of subsequent democratization).”
A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption (2005, positive): “Acemoglu et al. (2001) used settler mortality rates as instrument for institutional quality (or risk of expropriation),”
Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance (2012, neutral): “Our key variable, shown in row 3, is the share of direct taxes (i.e., income, social security, payroll, and property taxes) in 14 See Wittfogel (1957), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Roland (2010).”
Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity (2009, methodology): “…of law is instrumented for, first using measures of the fraction of the population speaking English or other European languages (as per Hall and Jones 1998),8 and then testing for robustness using the colonial mortality instruments developed for a smaller set of countries by Acemoglu et al (2001).”