The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods

By Martin Sefton, Robert Shupp, James M. Walker. 2006

618 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1be1218d9d03fa7b937303b5e6a19b899f2fc98c

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Citations in the corpus

Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011, neutral): “These factors might help to explain why in the existing experiments in which subjects were offered a choice between playing a voluntary contribution game without and one with informal sanctions, most subjects initially opposed the sanction regime.”
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “In a linear public goods game without leadership, Sefton et al. (2006) have shown that rewards seem less effective than sanctions in raising contribution levels.”
Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility (2012, background): “Several factors influencing PGG contributions have been identified (Zelmer, 2003), including the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions, which group members can impose on free riders (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Sefton et al., 2007).”
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment (2005, background): “…to target punishments at one another following their initial contribution decisions (Fehr and Gächter, 2000a, 2002, Carpenter and Matthews (2002), Sefton et al., 2002), although earnings are increased little if at all in this case, due to the costliness of punishment (Bochet et al., 2002; Page…”
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement (2012, result): “A number of subsequent studies have corroborated these results (e.g., Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Sefton et al., 2007).”
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, background): “Though one can find a wide range of technologies for the punishment option (ranging from a 1:1 ratio in Sefton et al., 2007, to a 1:5 ratio in Andreoni et al., 2003), the comparative statics of different technologies on contribution levels have only recently been examined systematically.”
Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments (2006, result): “Similar experiments, including Carpenter (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2002), and Page, Putterman and Unel (2002), found that while contributions don't always increase with repetition, the trend of decay was substantially mitigated.”
Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, methodology): “, by interspersing rounds of the public goods game with the prisoner’s dilemma game) [57,96].”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “Allowing subjects to reward other group members in a public goods game (second-party reward) is as effective as second-party punishment in promoting cooperation in all but the final period of fixed length public goods games (Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010), and in indefinitely repeated pub”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Sefton et al. (2007) explore the relative efficacy of punishments and rewards as well using a repeated public goods game and a between subjects design.”
A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments (2008, neutral): “1 See, for example, Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and Gachter (2000, 2002), Masclet et al. (2003), Carpenter (2007a), Nikiforakis (2005), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005) Anderson”
An investment game with third-party intervention (2007, background): “ Sefton et al. (2002) compare second-party reward to cooperators versus punishment to defectors”