Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments

By Olivier Bochet, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman. 2006

650 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/925f560b481b351a762a88919bd2a5b914f5986c

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Citations in the corpus

Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game (2009, background): “If cheap talk was permitted, a round began with the allocator being prompted to choose a message, which would then be seen by the investor.(6) At that time, the investor also observed the allocator’s previous action, if that information was available.”
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009, neutral): “23 A promising first step in this direction is set by the study of Carpenter and Matthews (2008), who aim at identifying different types of norms in public good games with homogeneous groups.”
Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review (2010, background): “However, other work finds that there is little to no difference between these two types of communication (Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2002; Bochet and Putterman 2009; Zheng et al. 2008, 2009).”
NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “…been observed in outlying cases or with the introduction of communication and/or punishment (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a; Bochet, Page, and Putterman, 2006; Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl, 2009; Xiao and Houser, 2011).27 Indeed, when we randomly assigned individuals to…”
Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment? (2006, background): “9 P10 is a treatment in Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006) , there called Reduction or R treatment; P20 is a”
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? (2008, neutral): “…(Botehlo et al., 2005a; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Ostrom et al., 1992; Sefton et al., 2005).15 Some studies nd that the introduction of punishment opportunities does not a¤ect earnings signi cantly (Bochet et al., 2006; Page et al., 2005; van Soest and Vyrastekova, 2006).”
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, neutral): “…can be enough to coerce others to cooperate (especially in later rounds), without even exercising the threat.6,7 Punishment had also some effect in Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2006), but they observed that the two influential forms of communication—face-to-face and chat room communication—had a…”
Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options (2010, positive): “…Lazear (1992)), recent experimental evidence has found that people will punish free riders even at considerable cost and that punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups (Carpenter (2007), Bochet, Page and Putterman (2003), Bowles, Carpenter, Gintis (2006) and Fehr and Gaechter (2000)).”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Bochet et al. (2006) extend this literature by directly comparing the relative efficacy of communication vis-à-vis punishment in sustaining cooperation using a between subjects design.”
The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “While overall punishment behavior is not affected by socio-demographic variables, we find that highly educated people and people who are a member of at least one voluntary civic organization are more likely to punish cooperators.”
“Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation (2014, background): “Previous literature has shown that communication between subjects can increase contributions in public good games (see Isaac et al. 1985, Isaac and Walker 1988, and Bochet et al. 2006).”