Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
By Matthias M. Cinyabuguma, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman. 2006
240 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/09cb2c836fcaca47ce15f73ee4627a504d56c98c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Simon Gächter
- Ernesto Reuben
- Charles N. Noussair
- David G. Rand
- Astrid Hopfensitz
- Luigi Luini
- Laurent Denant-Boèmont
- Marco Casari
In Safety Research
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Simon Gächter
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Ernesto Reuben
- Charles N. Noussair
- David G. Rand
- Marco Casari
- Nikos Nikiforakis
In Sociology and Political Science
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Simon Gächter
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Ernesto Reuben
- David G. Rand
- Charles N. Noussair
- Marco Casari
- Luigi Luini
Citations in the corpus
- Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, methodology): “However, Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) suggest that the specific mechanism for implementing counter-punishments might make a big difference to their eventual impact. In the Cinyabuguma et al. study, participants do not learn the identity of those who punished them. This makes it impossible to engage in ”
- Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty (2010, background): “Noise may weaken 10Recent studies (e.g., Cinyabuguma et al. 2006) investigate punishment directed toward cooperators.”
- A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments (2008, unknown): “…(2000, 2002), Masclet et al. (2003), Carpenter (2005), Nikiforakis (2005), Noussair and Tucker (2005), Page et al. (2005), Sefton et al. (2005), Anderson and Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006), Cinyabuguma et al. (2006), Gürerk et al. (2006), Carpenter (2007), Denant-Boemont et al. (2007).”
- The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “Our results show that it does not take 'counterpunishment' (i.e., multiple rounds of retaliatory punishment for having got punished) to limit successful self-governance (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008).”
- Voting on Punishment Systems Within a Heterogeneous Group (2011, background): “This tendency has been termed anti-social or perverse punishment (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006), and the incidence of this behavior varies greatly depending on population studied (Herrmann et al, 2008).”
- The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “Yet experiments show that defectors may retaliate when punished in repeated games (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant- Boemont et al., 2007; Dreber et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Wu et al., 2009), that defectors may punish cooperators even in the absence of the possibility for retaliation (either…”
- Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment (2007, result): “We will refer to these forms of second order sanctioning as “sanction enforcement”.4 Cinyabuguma et al. (2004, 2005) report an experiment in which individuals observe how much of other players’ punishment assignments over the previous three periods (of play of a repeated game) are directed toward…”
- The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment (2006, background): “We also observe only one case in which a second mover was punished for returning 150 points (for similar behaviour see, Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Gächter and Herrmann, 2006).”
- Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011, unknown): “…studies demonstrate that a frequent problem with informal sanctions is that some of them are perversely or anti-socially directed not at free riders but at cooperators, for reasons among which the desire for retaliation seems to figure prominently (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008).”
- Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? (2008, unknown): “Unlike in this experiment, participants in Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) can only take revenge "blindly" as they are not informed about who punished them.”
- Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment (2009, background): “This has been documented by a number of studies (Gächter and Herrmann, 2006; Houser et al., 2005; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006).”