Altruistic punishment in humans

By Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter. Nature, 2002

5,235 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/69c2a5ea51a3fba2b24eec63c809a6c86a058e36

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Citations in the corpus

Behavioral Norms: Variants and Their Identification (2014, background): “Sanctions have also been demonstrated experimentally: In the public goods game described above, group members will punish free-riders by levying fines, even if doing so costs them money (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions (2010, methodology): “We conducted a “public goods” game based on standard techniques (Fehr & Gachter 2002) using real monetary rewards as motivation and two treatment conditions: group competition and without group competition.”
Evolution of the social contract (2014, background): “…money, offering them the chance to give it away, and observing their behaviour [Fehr et al., 2002, Camerer and Fehr, 2006, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Gintis et al., 2003, Henrich et al., 2005, Herrmann et al., 2008, Bernhard et al., 2006, Fowler et al., 2005, Egas and…”
How can we promote behaviour that serves all of us in the future (2008, background): “…with definitions of altruism, which across disciplines, range from behavioral definitions (i.e., acts of costly helping are considered altruistic ; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) to definitions that seek to exclude any possible mechanism that may be activated by some consideration that may not be free of…”
Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “Source: Figure reproduced with permission from [93].”
Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game (2004, background): “Both first-and second-round dictators were told that they would be dividing $10 only one time, and that this would be the only decision they would be asked to make during the experiment.”
Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (2009, background): “The ability to examine punishment behavior is important because as suggested by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002), such “altruistic” punishment by homo reciprocans, humans who are willing to punish norm violators even when such punishment is costly to the punishers, may be the…”
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, background): “Over the past decade, the effects of reward and punishment on cooperation in social dilemma games have received considerable attention, for instance, in Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003), Masclet et al. (2003), or Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007).”
The Anatomy of Motivation: An Evolutionary-Ecological Approach (2013, background): “Recent theoretical and experimental work demonstrates that ultra-social life cannot be maintained without the justice motive (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Price et al. 2002).”
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005, background): “When the PGG is played repeatedly with the same partners, the level of contribution declines towards zero, culminating in most subjects refusing to contribute to the common pool (Andreoni, 1988; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002).”
Are Conservatives Less Likely to be Prosocial than Liberals? From Games to Ideology, Political Preferences and Votingg (2012, methodology): “This focus has been complemented by research examining instrumental forms of cooperation, or second-order forms of cooperation, such as providing punishment to those who free-ride on the efforts of others, or providing reward to people who cooperated (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi, 1988).”