The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation

By Umut Öneş, Louis Putterman. 2007

171 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9e7f6ecaf16ceeacff566abae29e62235f6e8921

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Citations in the corpus

Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, unknown): “There are now plausible theoretical answers to the above questions, and in some cases there is an overabundance of plausible answers.”
Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2011, unknown): “This result has been confirmed by several previ- 2 ous experiments where, without subjects’ knowledge, groups are formed exogenously based on previous contribution behavior (Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe, 2007; Ones and Putterman, 2007).”
Social learning and voluntary cooperation among like-minded people (2005, background): “Data of the experiments without the punishment option: Contribution Profit Treatment Group Rank Class Ranking treatment Main treatment Last period St. dev. main treat. main treatment Sorted N 1 1 T 20.0 19.3 13.3 1.15 35.5 2 2 T 20.0 19.3 13.3 1.15 35.5 3 3 T 20.0 19.3 13.3 1.15 35.5 4 4 T 16.7 14.4”
The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “While overall punishment behavior is not affected by socio-demographic variables, we find that highly educated people and people who are a member of at least one voluntary civic organization are more likely to punish cooperators.”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Like Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007), Ones and Putterman (2007) find that early contributions can serve as a significant predictor of contributions in later periods.”
Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, background): “heterogeneity the “ecology of collective action”, as Ones and Putterman (forthcoming) aptly put it, matters a lot for the efficiency of voluntary cooperation.4”