Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency
By Talbot Page, Louis Putterman, Bulent Unel. 2005
397 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91d38126232db40c1065dc90e35163b462e27f55
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Benedikt Herrmann
- S. Gaechter
- Francesco Guala
- Pat Barclay
- G. Fellner
- Alexander Vostroknutov
- Erik O. Kimbrough
Citations in the corpus
- NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “Similarly, allowing individuals to form their own groups increases average contributions, but there is still a tendency for contributions to decline over time (Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005). from rule-breakers’ overall, providing support for norm-reciprocity.”
- Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, background): “In Ones and Putterman (forthcoming) and Page et al. (2005) subjects learned about others’ contributions and were then regrouped according to the subjects’ preferences of who they wanted to be grouped with.”
- Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism (2006, unknown): “all instances of punishment in the partner group treatments of Fehr and Gächter (2000a), and Page et al. (2003), but is less in Fehr and Gächter’s’s stranger and perfect stranger treatments, evidently because “blind revenge” motive underlies it in partner groups and is absent when group composition ”
- Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment? (2006, methodology): “treatment in Page, Putterman and Unel 2005, there called Punishment treatment.”
- Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2011, unknown): “One route to sustain cooperation is to limit access to (or exit from) endogenously formed groups (Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 2008; Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005).”
- Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “They extend the findings of Page et al. (2005) and Gächter and Thöni (2005) by testing whether cooperative preferences are stable over time and whether differences in group outcomes can be predicted by knowing the types of participants who compose those groups.”