Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship

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Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty (2011, background): “Levin (2003) extends the model to allow for either moral hazard over the worker’s effort or adverse selection over the worker’s type. Levin (2002) allows the principal to employ multiple workers, comparing multilateral and bilateral contracts.”
Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations (2007, background): “risk averse and doesn’t have hidden savings or only cares about terminal consumption as in the model of Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1987).(31) It is interesting to point out in relation to their paper that private monitoring although costly because of the non-verifiability of output, is advant”
Relational Incentive Contracts (2003, methodology): “Levin (2003) considers two cases.”