A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

By Martin Pesendorfer. 2000

403 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/94df2562deab0241471c35b6335cbc69c117c5f1

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Market sharing agreements and collusive networks (2004, neutral): “8 In general Þrst-price auctions, Pesendorfer (2000) presents partial characterization results on the equilibrium of an auction with a bidding ring and independent bidders.”
Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values (2003, background): “Other examples include collusion among some bidders known as cartel (see Porter and Zona, 1993; Baldwin et al., 1997; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2002), asymmetrically informed bidders in OCS drainage auctions (see Hendricks and Porter, 1988; Hendricks et al., 1994) or joint bidding in OCS…”
Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works (2009, methodology): “i,c,t are considered to be cost variables and are often used in the estimation of bidding behavior, such as in the studies of Porter and Zona (1993, 1999), Pesendorfer (2000) , and Lee (1999).”
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory (2003, background): “attention to the analysis of one-shot auctions (von Ungern-Sternberg [1988], McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Pesendorfer [2000] ).”
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008, background): “Researchers have proposed several approaches to assess whether auction data are consistent with competitive or collusive bidding (Porter and Zona 1993, 1999; Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard, 1997; 3 Bajari, 1997; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2003; Asker, 2008).”
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (2003, background): “We assume that markups were independently and identically distributed, then (42) implies the following distribution:”
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions (2004, background): “A few notable exceptions study asymmetries in auctions with Þxed participation, including Bajari (1997), Brannman and Froeb (2000), Pesendorfer (2000), Jofre-Benet and Pesendorfer (2003), and Brendstrup and Paarsch (2003a, 2003b).”
Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions (2016, background): “…into two groups: the studies of collusion practices in markets where the presence of cartels’ existence has been proved by court (Asker, 2010, Pesendorfer, 2000, Porter and Zona, 1993 and 1999) and the studies that try to devise methods to distinguish competition from collusion in…”
Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002, background): “The analysis of the bidders’ equilibrium behavior in this case provides a useful benchmark for the more realistic case in which complementarities are present.”
A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel (2010, background): “Susan Athey, Jonathon Levin, and Enrique Seira (2004) also test for collusion in timber auctions.11 As in this study, Martin Pesendorfer (2000) examines the activity of a known cartel in the market for milk provided to high schools.”