Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
By Pat Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, Jonathan D. Levin. 2004
1,057 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/10c55cc7283bf7af19e3675651c082aaff7f4a07
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- P. Grieco
- Donald W. K. Andrews
- Á. D. Paula
- Victor Chernozhukov
- Patrik Guggenberger
- D. Chetverikov
- Kengo Kato
- H. R. Moon
In Marketing
- P. Grieco
- Á. D. Paula
- Donald W. K. Andrews
- Harikesh S. Nair
- D. Chetverikov
- Victor Chernozhukov
- Patrik Guggenberger
- Pradeep Chintagunta
Citations in the corpus
- Structural Modeling in Marketing: Review and Assessment (2006, background): “By contrast, recent approaches, based on Berry et al. (1995), explicitly assume an individual-level choice model that is derived from utility maximization to underlie the aggregate data.”
- A practical two-step method for testing moment inequalities (2014, neutral): “Berger and Boos (1994) and Silvapulle (1996) improve upon Loh (1985) by introducing a Bonferonnitype correction similar to ours.”
- Constrained Optimization Approaches to Estimation of Structural Models (2011, methodology): “…we plan to investigate the applicability of the MPEC approach to estimate dynamic discrete-choice games studied in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).”
- VALIDITY OF SUBSAMPLING AND “PLUG-IN ASYMPTOTIC” INFERENCE FOR PARAMETERS DEFINED BY MOMENT INEQUALITIES (2009, background): “…Department of Economics, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281; e-mail: donald.andrews@yale.edu. c© 2009 Cambridge University Press 0266-4666/09 $15.00 669 and Tamer (2003), Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2004), and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007).”
- Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria (2012, methodology): “The strategy builds on the earlier work byHotz&Miller (1993) for the estimation of empirical (individual) dynamic discrete choice models and later work by Aguirregabiria&Mira (2007) and Bajari et al. (2007) for dynamic games (in which information is incomplete).”
- A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation (2009, methodology): “The estimator for the 1st stage of our empirical strategy is based on the recent literature on two-step estimation of dynamic decisions (Hotz and Miller 1993; Bajari et al. 2007 ).”
- Estimating Network Economies in Retail Chains: A Revealed Preference Approach (2010, background): “) Because we have explicitly controlled for the structural error in ξj , we now assume that any remaining idiosyncratic error leading to violations of inequality (3) is median independent of the included covariates.”
- Semiparametric Inference in Dynamic Binary Choice Models, Second Version (2014, methodology): “Several papers used it for testing new methodologies for estimation of dynamic discrete choice models (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), and Norets (2009)).”
- Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics (2016, methodology): “To estimate the dynamic parameters, we follow the two-step empirical strategy laid out in Bajari et al. (2007), and used in Ryan (2012). First, we estimate the policy functions that describe firm investment, entry, and exit behaviors as a function of economic state variables.”
- Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis (2015, background): “Note the literature provides suggestions that would avoid the NFXP, such as Bajari et al. (2007), where value functions are forward simulated.”