Deciding Between Competition and Collusion

By Patrick Bajari, Lixin Ye. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2003

436 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1f890ad7cc2926184850b391eeac9761b1c26998

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Citations in the corpus

Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions (2016, background): “This literature can be roughly divided into two groups: the studies of collusion practices in markets where the presence of cartels’ existence has been proved by court (Asker, 2010, Pesendorfer, 2000, Porter and Zona, 1993 and 1999) and the studies that try to devise methods to distinguish competiti”
Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values (2003, background): “Other examples include collusion among some bidders known as cartel (see Porter and Zona, 1993; Baldwin et al., 1997; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2002 ), asymmetrically informed bidders in OCS drainage auctions (see Hendricks and Porter, 1988; Hendricks et al., 1994) or joint bidding in OCS a”
The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions (2005, methodology): “These variables are also used to control for rival cost heterogeneity and are similar to variables used by Bajari and Ye (2003).15 In the analysis that follows, it is important to control for factors that change over time other than the ECE information.”
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions (2004, background): “5Examples include Porter and Zona (1993, 1999), Bajari and Ye (2003), Pesendorfer (2000); see Bajari and Summers (2002) for a survey.”
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008, background): “As statistical detection of collusion is known to be a di¢ cult problem (e.g. Bajari and Ye, 2003), it is interesting to consider more re ned predictions of the collusive model.”
Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works (2009, methodology): “…and conspiratory practices, and the 3 e¤ectiveness of the implementation of the Japanese competition law has been doubtful.4 We follow the method proposed by Porter and Zona (1993; 1999) and elaborated by Bajari and Ye (2003), and base our inference of market competitiveness on bidding data.”
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions (2011, neutral): “We perform an empirical assessment of the program, building upon earlier studies of the highway procurement market such as Bajari and Ye (2003), Hong and Shum (2002), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Krasnokutskaya (2003) and Porter and Zona (1993).”
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis (2006, methodology): “In Bajari and Ye (2003) we demonstrated that theshadow value of capacity enters into the ﬁrst order conditions like a deterministic cost shifter.”
Contemporary Bayesian Econometrics and Statistics (2005, methodology): “similar tools, see Sareen (1999, 2003), Bajari and Lee (2003), and Albano and Jouneau-Sion (2004).]”
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs (2014, methodology): “ ()  = c ()  · q ≡ b () · q(1 + e()  ) (8)”
The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs (2012, neutral): “We then test the difference across the three quantiles from the two models in Columns (1) and (2) in both Tables 5 and 6.”
An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions (2003, background): “Bajari and Ye [2002] also find that rival distance and rival backlog are not statistically significant in reduced form bid equations.”