THE TIME STRUCTURE OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS

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Political Economy of Mechanisms (2008, methodology): “The most general formulation of dynamic principal-agent problems is provided by Ray (2002).”
Politicians, Taxes, and Debt (2010, unknown): “This is in contrast with the work of Ray (2002) and Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a,b) who show that payments must be backloaded to provide incentives.”
Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs : theory and empirical evidence (2008, background): “6See Thomas and Worrall (1988), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Ray (2002).”
Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (2007, unknown): “However, in Thomas and Worrall (and more generally in Ray, 2002), the government eventually accumulates sufficient assets to overcome its lack of commitment.”
Relational Incentive Contracts (2003, methodology): “In the model in Ray (2002), any ESE also maximizes the supplier’s payoff from some finite t′ > τ on as long as qt < q∗ t for all t ≥ τ .”