Relational Incentive Contracts

By Jonathan D. Levin. 2003

703 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a76c0f25b46bdcb986cbc0abaf6bb1f8a479a096

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Citations in the corpus

Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk (2008, neutral): “Similarly, the relational contracting literature (see for instance, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985), Bull (1987), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002), or Levin (2003)) often makes the point that reducing the players' outside option facilitates cooperation.”
The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports (2015, positive): “We first turn to a version of the model with no contract enforcement, developed along the lines of the relational contracts literature (see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomsom (1989) and Levin (2003)).”
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices* (2011, background): “For a further comparative discussion of our paper and Levin (2003), see the online Appendix Section 2.1.”
Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (2002, background): “The remaining of this subsection heavily relies on Luebbert (1991), Lehmbruch (1999), and Streeck (1995, 1997).”
Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, background): “A common approach to modeling such relational contracts is to use a repeated game, just as models of tacit collusion in industrial organization have used repeated games for several decades; see Levin (2003) for the state of the art.”
Customers’ Risk Factor Disclosures and Suppliers’ Investment Efficiency (2019, background): “Levin (2003) considers a repeated game setting in which”
Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment (2018, background): “Or it could be enforced by a private actor or group of actors who penalize contract violations by, for example, imposing social sanctions or cutting off valuable relationships; the latter contracts are known as relational contracts [13, 29, 31, 32].”
Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information (2013, background): “In particular, the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) implies that first-best efficiency can be approximately achieved as the discount factor tends to one.”