Economic Insights from Internet Auctions
By Patrick Bajari, Ali Hortaçsu. 2004
544 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91b7dc112081332e56e702ea039e8d9cb02edab6
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- S. Tadelis
- Jonathan D. Levin
- Baohong Sun
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
- Charles A. Wood
- Kannan Srinivasan
- Justus Haucap
- Bo Pang
In Marketing
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
- Justus Haucap
- Liran Einav
- Torben Stühmeier
- Baohong Sun
- Joni L. Jones
- Kannan Srinivasan
- Bo Pang
Citations in the corpus
- Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification (2014, unknown): “Apart from minor country-specific differences (e.g., prices are listed in pounds), it is noteworthy that a larger fraction of items on the UK platform are listed for sale at fixed prices (instead of auctions) than on the US site3 and a greater proportion of items are listed by professional sellers.”
- Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016, background): “See Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) for an older survey that references more studies.”
- Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization? (2014, background): “In fact, a good reputation on eBay translates into higher prices for sellers, as has been repeatedly documented (see, e.g., Melnik and Alm 2002; Bajari and Hortaçsu 2004; Dellarocas 2006; 2 A much more detailed analysis of a potential antitrust case against Google and the costs and benefits of…”
- Competition and antitrust in internet markets (2016, background): “Another form of switching cost exists on auction platforms such as eBay where, apart from indirect network effects, the user’s reputation is also highly relevant (see, e.g., Melnik and Alm, 2002; Bajari and Hortaçsu, 2004).”
- Retailer Pricing and Competitive Effects (2009, unknown): “This makes reputation mechanisms, such as eBay seller ratings, particularly salient (Bajari and Hortacsu 2004).”
- Predictive Analytics in Information Systems Research (2011, unknown): “…has only found limited applicability in the move from offline to online auctions, and where empirical research of online auctions has raised new theoretical and practical questions that classical auction theory does not address (Bajari and Hortacsu 2004; Bapna et al. 2008; Pinker et al. 2003).”
- A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products (2010, unknown): “Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) review the institutional details of eBay and internet auctions, and they summarize a broad body of literature that has emerged to examine trade in these markets.”
- Explaining and Forecasting Online Auction Prices and Their Dynamics Using Functional Data Analysis (2008, methodology): “Most of this research has been published in the economics, marketing, and information systems literature (e.g., Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and Reeves 2000; Roth and Ockenfels 2002; Ba and Pavlou 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003, 2004; Bapna, Goes, Gupta, and Jin 2004).”
- Strategic Herding Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Loan Auctions (2011, background): “Research has also shown that herding intensifies toward the end of eBay auctions because of sniping, which is the tendency to place bids during the last few minutes of an auction (Bajari and Hortaçsu 2004).”
- The Sound of Silence in Online Feedback: Estimating Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting Bias (2008, result): “Consistent with past empirical research in online auctions (see Bajari and Hortacsu 2004; Resnick et al. 2006 for surveys), it is plausible to assume that eBay’s outcome and reporting probabilities are dependent on the following properties of the buyer, seller and transaction: • Trader’s feedback…”
- Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E‐Auctions for Procurement? (2007, background): “Such empirical examinations have led to the detection of empirical regularities that run counter to classical auction theory and the search for better models to explain these regularities (Bajari and Hortacsu 2004).”