Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model

By Martín Larraza-Kintana, Robert M. Wiseman, Luis R. Gómez-Mejía, T. Welbourne. 2007

227 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9bca14bb94fd78e1c5b77eb58b5224d49d95f074

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Citations in the corpus

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, methodology): “…studies informed by behavioural versions of Agency Theory have found that in some contexts boards may prefer ‘subjective’ behaviour-based assessment and contracting rather than ‘objective’ outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “…mixed gamble; see Bromiley, 2009, 2010) may help scholars to elucidate conflicting results about the relationship between stock option wealth and managerial risk taking (Balkin, Markman, & Gómez-Mejía, 2000; Devers et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Sanders, 2001; Souder & Shaver, 2010).”
Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-controlled Firms: Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills (2007, background): “Our findings have important practical implications, because organizational risk preferences may affect new product introductions, capital expenditures, entry into new markets, the willingness to use non-traditional methods, investment policies, and the like (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007).”
Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model (2013, unknown): “The previous predictions of CEO risk behavior in response to stock options implicitly assume a passive actor that reacts to but does not manage the risk contained in a compensation package (Devers et al., 2007, 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007).”
Top Management Conservatism and Corporate Risk Strategies: Evidence from Managers' Personal Political Orientation and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “, 2011) and have found success with unobtrusive measures of CEO personality such as narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), CEO emotions (Delgado-Garcia and De La Fuente-Sabate, 2010), or the structure of compensation as proxies for executives’ attitudes toward risk (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007”
Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk (2008, background): “Accordingly, in contrast with exercisable options, we expect that CEOs will not endow their personal wealth with high levels of accumulated unexercisable option value (Devers et al. 2007, Larraza-Kintana et al. 2007) and, therefore, perceive much less value at risk.”
Management Theory Applications of Prospect Theory: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Opportunities (2011, unknown): “For example, we are encouraged by Larraza-Kintana et al.’s (2007) approach to measuring risk taking.”
Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking (2015, methodology): “In contrast with this, if the intrinsic value is zero, ESOs do not create risk bearing, which will then not produce executive risk aversion (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).”
The Role of Family Influence in Firms’ Strategic Responses to Threat of Imitation (2008, unknown): “Both investments in R&D and internationalization indicate strategic risk-taking by firms (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007) and signify that family-influenced firms are willing to take risks when they face threats of imitability.”