Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk

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Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model (2013, positive): “By contrast, Devers et al. (2008) find a positive relationship.”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, neutral): “…mixed gamble; see Bromiley, 2009, 2010) may help scholars to elucidate conflicting results about the relationship between stock option wealth and managerial risk taking (Balkin, Markman, & Gómez-Mejía, 2000; Devers et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Sanders, 2001; Souder & Shaver, 2010).”
Do CEOs Matter to Firm Strategic Actions and Firm Performance? A Meta-Analytic Investigation Based on Upper Echelons Theory (2016, positive): “Supporting Devers et al. (2008), Miller and Bromiley (1990) found that capital investment, leverage, and product innovation (in the form of R&D) had large and unique factor loadings on the same strategic risk factor.”
Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms (2014, neutral): “Again, following the findings of Devers et al. (2008), we included both the dollar value of the equity held by each TMT and the dollar value of the restricted stock grants held.”
Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment (2010, background): “, stock options), different influences can be exerted depending on level of ownership and whether or not options are exercisable (Devers et al., 2008).”