When will boards influence strategy? Inclination × power = strategic change

By Brian R. Golden, Edward J. Zajac. 2001

679 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Gender Studies, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ecbeaadefab8554f225a76caf037812b00dfd4a

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Citations in the corpus

Can Directors Impact Performance? A case‐based test of three theories of corporate governance (2007, neutral): “A new research stream may follow the current trend to study large-scale data sources with new and innovative methodologies (e.g. Golden and Zajac, 2001), but we would also suggest the use of more qualitative data methodologies (Pettigrew, 1992) to investigate board process.”
Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness and Financial Performance (2009, neutral): “Indeed, boards are now expected to be more involved in the strategy formulation and implementation activities of the organizations (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Golden and Zajac, 2001; Stiles, 2001; Felton and Watson, 2002; Useem, 2003).”
Corporate Governance and Performance in Publicly Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan (2005, methodology): “Although independent directors may provide a particularly important strategic contribution by a direct involvement in developing strategy, the research literature on corporate boards suggests that board involvement in policy-making is often passive, and it relies mainly on financial outcomes of stra”
Director Human Capital, Information Processing Demands, and Board Effectiveness (2014, neutral): “…their composition, structure, behavior, vigilance, decision-making processes, and power (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Garg & Eisenhardt, 2013; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Westphal & Milton, 2000; also see Zahra & Pearce, 1989 and Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009 for…”
Executive Personality, Capability Cues, and Risk Taking (2011, background): “They typically depend on others in their organizations to generate investment proposals (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1996), and they must obtain their boards’ approvals for substantial outlays (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001).”
Management accounting systems, top management team heterogeneity and strategic change (2007, background): “…which is the extent to which the team consists of managers with varying backgrounds and competences, systematically varies with the organization’s inclination and ability to engage in strategic change (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Jarzabkowski & Searle, 2005).”
Top executive compensation, regional institutions and Chinese OFDI (2014, background): “This may indicate that larger boards have difficulty reaching consensus on important decisions, such as OFDI strategic decisions, or may have a slow response to opportunities in foreign countries (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004).”
The dysfunctions of power in teams: A review and emergent conflict perspective (2017, background): “…can include great power inequities within the team (e.g., Bunderson, 2003; Pitcher & Smith, 2001), illegitimate power dispersions (e.g., Martorana et al.. 2005), easily mutable power dispersions (e.g., Hays & Bendersky, 2015), and factionalization within the team (e.g., Golden & Zajac, 2001).”
Women directors' contribution to board decision‐making and strategic involvement: The role of equality perception (2010, background): “diversity in functional, educational and industry background) to firm strategy (Goodstein et al., 1994; Golden and Zajac, 2001), no studies have linked board gender diversity to strategic decisionmaking.”
The Too-Much-of-a-Good-Thing Effect in Management (2013, background): “…suggests that expanding the composition of boards of directors beyond five to seven members may inhibit corporate governance and performance (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Huther, 1997; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Westphal, 1998; Yermack, 1996).”
Corporate Governance and Performance of Indian Firms: The Effect of Board Size and Ownership (2005, background): “From this perspective, smaller boards are assumed to have inadequate recognition of the need to initiate or support strategic change, a lack of clear understanding of alternatives, and/or lack of confidence in recommending strategic change ( Goilden & Zajac, 2001 ).”