Can Directors Impact Performance? A case‐based test of three theories of corporate governance
By Gavin Nicholson, Geoffrey Kiel. 2007
574 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5685f1677a1218b9547d273aeac378d4ada95a5c
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In Accounting
- Franz Willi Kellermanns
- K. Eddleston
- Khaleed Omair Alotaibi
- R. Sarathy
- Francis X. Murphy
- Carlo Salvato
- K. Hussainey
- Afzalur Rashid
Citations in the corpus
- Revisiting Agency Theory: Evidence of Board Independence and Agency Cost from Bangladesh (2015, background): “It is also argued that accounting profit can be very high even in the presence of agency cost (Nicholson and Kiel 2007), and not all the”
- Innovativeness in family firms: a family influence perspective (2010, background): “Acknowledging that ‘‘family firms are not a homogeneous group of organizations’’ (Corbetta and Salvato 2004, p. 360), we draw from both agency and stewardship theory as complementary perspectives (e.g., Nicholson and Kiel 2007) to explore how innovativeness interacts with family influences to affect”
- Corporate governance and firms financial performance in the United Kingdom (2020, background): “Other scholars argue in support of stewardship theory that, inside directors are trustworthy stewards of firms’ resources and improve company performance because of information asymmetry (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).”
- Board Composition and Firm Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh (2010, unknown): “It is argued that boards comprising outside independent directors will counter the agency problem by being able to monitor any self interested actions by managers (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008).”
- Determinants of CSR disclosure quantity and quality: Evidence from non-financial listed firms in Saudi Arabia (2016, background): “Particularly, when the agents have access to the information, this increases their ability to work towards firm’s welfare (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).”
- Innate and discretionary accruals quality and corporate governance (2010, unknown): “2 Inside and outside directors play different roles and have different types of expertise (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).”