Teacher Pay For Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching

By Matthew G. Springer, L. Hamilton, Daniel F McCaffrey, D. Ballou, Vi-Nhuan Le, Matthew J. Pepper, J. R. Lockwood, B. Stecher. 2010

342 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6d07c4b4131b09344a4c8fcc33e748257cc18695

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Citations in the corpus

Social Experiments in the Labor Market (2016, unknown): “Another example is the increasing number of randomized trials evaluating the role of economic incentives for teachers (e.g., Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff 2012; Fryer 2013; Springer et al. 2010).”
Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from Pakistan (2015, background): “…(see, for example, Glewwe et al 2010; Behrman, Parker, Todd, and Wolpin 2012; Sojourner, Mykerezi, and West 2014; and Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff 2012; and yet in others, there is no evidence of positive impacts (see, for example, Fryer 2013; Springer et al 2011; and Goodman and Turner 2013).”
The Economic Value of Higher Teacher Quality. Working Paper 56. (2010, background): “ 6 increased interest has also led both to experimental studies (Springer et al. (2010)) Additionally, international experimentation has led to more recent analyses (see, for example, Lavy (2009) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009)).”
Improving Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries: Lessons from Rigorous Evaluations (2014, background): “See, for example, studies on merit pay plans in New York (Fryer, 2011), Tennessee (Springer et al., 2011) and Chicago (Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012).”
Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education (2011, background): “A 3-year experiment conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville School System provided incentive pay to middle school mathematics teachers (Springer et al., 2010).”
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT. (2015, unknown): “For example, the Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study that provided randomly assigned middle-school mathematics teachers in Nashville individual bonuses of as much as $15,000 if their students met ambitious performance thresholds (Springer et al., 2010).”
The New Educational Accountability: Understanding the Landscape of Teacher Evaluation in the Post-NCLB Era (2016, background): “pay for performance and student achievement is mixed (see, e.g., Figlio and Kenny 2007; Fryer 2011; Goldhaber and Walch 2012; Springer et al. 2010).”
Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools (2011, unknown): “Springer et al. ð2010Þ found there was no significant treatment effect on student achievement and on measures of teachers’ response such as teaching practices.5 The contribution of this article is threefold.”
Teacher Evaluation Policy and Conflicting Theories of Motivation (2014, background): “Nashville, TN: National Center on Performance Incentives.”
Teacher quality policy when supply matters (2012, background): “Rick Hess, responding to the POINT study of teacher performance bonuses (Springer et al., 2010), argues that identifying the selection effects of such policies requires that the researcher “start by identifying a couple thousand high school students, follow them for fifteen or twenty years, and stud”
The Effect of Evaluation on Teacher Performance (2012, result): “While theoretically promising, the early work in this area suggests mixed results (Springer et al. 2010; Neal 2011).”
Effective teaching in elementary mathematics: Identifying classroom practices that support student achievement (2015, background): “…imperative (Hanushek, 2009), longstanding traditions that reward education and training or of- fer financial incentives based on student achievement have been met with limited success (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2006; Fryer, 2013; Harris & Sass, 2011; Springer et al., 2010).”
The Design of Performance Pay in Education (2011, unknown): “Springer et al. (2010) Program involved 5th- through 8th-grade math teachers.”
Does the Match Matter? Exploring Whether Student Teaching Experiences Affect Teacher Effectiveness (2017, background): “Moreover, the empirical literature about policies designed to affect teacher quality—such as pay for performance (e.g., Fryer, Levitt, List, & Sadoff, 2012; Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010; Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Springer et al., 2011) and professional development (e.”
Evaluating Teacher Evaluation (2012, result): “A study of Tennessee teachers who volunteered to be evaluated based on VAMs and to have a substantial share of their compensation tied to their VAM results, corroborated this evidence: After three years, 85% thought the VAM evaluation ignored important aspects of their performance that test scores d”
Parent-Child Information Frictions and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2020, background): “They often rely on financial incentives, either for teachers (Springer et al. 2010; Fryer 2011), for students (Angrist and Lavy 2002; Bettinger 2010; Fryer 2011), or for parents (Miller, Riccio, and Smith 2009).1 Providing financial incentives for high school students costs $538 per 0.10–standard…”
Education and Poverty: Confronting the Evidence. Working Papers Series. SAN11-01. (2011, background): “…in which randomly assigned math teachers in grades 5 to 8 in Nashville were offered large bonuses for raising their students' test scores, for example, no differences emerged in the test scores of those teachers offered the incentive and those in the control group (Springer et al., 2010).”