The Design of Performance Pay in Education

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Teacher Effects and Teacher-Related Policies (2014, unknown): “Staiger and Rockoff (2010) and Neal (2012) take these simulations one step further, deriving optimal rules for teacher dismissal when a school district wishes to maximize teacher value added.”
Behavioral Economics of Education (2015, background): “Dohmen and Falk (2010) find 20 Neal (2011) examines the design of incentive schemes in educational contexts. that those who select into the teacher job are, relative to the comparison group, more risk-averse, more trusting, less negatively reciprocal and less conscientious, the latter of which the…”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, background): “See Neal (2011) for a review. reduction in anemia among their students.”
The Distribution of Teacher Quality and Implications for Policy (2012, background): “See Hanushek et al. 2011a, pp. 1–87 Mincer J. 1970.”
Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools (2011, unknown): “…body of literature on the role of teacher incentives on student performance ðLavy 2002, 2009; Vigdor 2008; Glazerman et al. 2009; Glewwe et al. 2010; Springer et al. 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011Þ, including an emerging literature on the optimal design of such incentives ðNeal 2011Þ.”