No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality

By Amna Kirmani, A. Rao. 2000

2,186 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Marketing, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/68cb4c3b682becf05cca626a005cc034c1adcecc

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Citations in the corpus

Effectiveness of Marketing Cues on Consumer Perceptions of Quality: The Moderating Roles of Brand Reputation and Third-Party Information (2013, background): “Warranties signal a manufacturer’s confidence in product quality and provide consumers with an assurance of quality to increase their confidence in the product (Erevelles, 1993; Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Shimp & Bearden, 1982).”
Warm Glow or Extra Charge? The Ambivalent Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Activities on Customers’ Perceived Price Fairness (2016, methodology): “This development implies that cost-signaling approaches (e.g., Kirmani and Rao 2000) should receive more attention in marketing research on consumer behavior.”
The Economics of Geographical Indications: Towards a Conceptual Framework for Geographical Indication Research in Developing Countries (2009, background): “Information economics (Kirmani and Rao (2000)) furthermore highlight the value of brands as a signaling device in order to reduce transaction costs, an analysis which can be fruitfully applied to the use of geographical indications.”
Persuasion in crowdfunding: An elaboration likelihood model of crowdfunding performance (2017, background): “However, entrepreneurs may face a number of barriers in attempting to create perceptions of quality via marketing-related decisions (Kirmani and Rao, 2000), due to the existence of limited resources (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006).”
Cooperation between corporations and environmental groups: A transaction cost perspective (2007, background): “For this reason, scholars have conjectured that reputation may represent a credible signal that a firm intends to deal honestly (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).”
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2011, background): “Kirmani and Rao (2000) provide a general example that helps illustrate a basic signaling model.”
The Economic Analysis of Advertising (2005, background): “Kirmani and Rao (2000) offer a recent survey.”
What is Quality? An Integrative Framework of Processes and States (2012, background): “…of stored customer knowledge accrued from a customer’s own experiences, other customers’ experiences, firm strategies (e.g., customer relationship and brand strategies), media reports, and quality signals associated with each attribute (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Woodruff, Cadotte, and Jenkins 1983).”
Do cross-border mergers and acquisitions increase short-term market performance? The case of Chinese firms (2017, background): “Signallers are insiders (e.g. managers or executives) who obtain information about individuals (Spence, 1973) and products (Kirmani & Rao, 2000) and organizations (Ross, 1977).”
Consumers rule: How consumer reviews influence perceived trustworthiness of online stores (2012, methodology): “Signaling theory has been developed in economics (Spence 1973) and biology (Zahavi 1975) and has been applied in information economics (e.g. Kirmani and Rao 2000).”
To have and to Hold: The Influence of Haptic Information on Product Judgments (2003, background): “A nonhaptic cue, such as a brand name (Erdem and Swait 1998), a return policy (Kirmani and Rao 2000), a warranty (Boulding and Kirmani 1993), or a low price (Dawar and Sarvary 1997), may also serve as a compensation mechanism that lessens or eliminates a consumer’s motivation to obtain haptic…”
The differential roles of brand credibility and brand prestige in consumer brand choice (2010, background): “From an information economics perspective, signaling theory is based on the assumption that a different level of product information flows between consumers and firms and causes the problem of information asymmetry (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).”