Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
By Brian L. Connelly, S. Certo, R. Duane Ireland, Christopher R. Reutzel. 2011
6,184 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Signaling theory is useful for describing behavior when two parties (individuals or organizations) have access to different information. Typically, one party, the sender, must choose whether and how to communicate (or signal) that information, and the other party, the receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal. Accordingly, signaling theory holds a prominent position in a variety of management literatures, including strategic management, entrepreneurship, and human resource management. While the use of signaling theory has gained momentum in recent years, its central tenets have become blurred as it has been applied to organizational concerns. The authors, therefore, provide a concise synthesis of the theory and its key concepts, review its use in the management literature, and put forward directions for future research that will encourage scholars to use signaling theory in new ways and to develop more complex formulations and nuanced variations of the theory.
Subfields: Communication, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bee1d8e313d71ad9b7a73e7e4e6fb3bf6dc59f93
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Citations in the corpus
- How Does Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility Matter in a Dysfunctional Institutional Environment? Evidence from China (2015, positive): “Under conditions of information asymmetry, stakeholders’ evaluations of legitimacy often reflect the collected signals of a firm’s quality and intention (Connelly et al. 2011).”
- Discontinuities, competition, and cooperation: Coopetitive dynamics between incumbents and entrants (2018, background): “Therefore, the identification of a producer’s perceived quality becomes a crucial signal for customers (Connelly et al., 2011).”
- The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior (2012, neutral): “According to Kothari (2001) and Dechow et al. (2010), a firm’s ERC is often used in accounting studies as a measure of investors’ perceived earnings quality.”
- Betting on the Coachable Entrepreneur: Signaling and Social Exchange in Entrepreneurial Pitches (2018, background): “In their review, Connelly et al. suggest that ‘‘something’’ is usually quality, which they define as ‘‘the underlying unobservable ability of the signaler to fulfill the needs or demands of an outsider observing the signal’’ (Connelly et al., 2011, p. 43).”
- Attracting applicants through the organization's social media page: Signaling employer brand personality (2019, background): “characteristics play an important role in the process of inferring employer brand personality signals from social media pages (Connelly et al., 2011).”
- Predicting overall customer satisfaction: Big data evidence from hotel online textual reviews (2019, background): “Signal theory describes the signal behavior between two parties where information asymmetry exists (Connelly et al., 2011).”