Corporate Elites and Corporate Strategy: How Demographic Preferences and Structural Position Shape the Scope of the Firm

By Michael Jensen, Edward J. Zajac. 2004

506 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/457b40d677222518e203b1ca63cd6b093b2e3973

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Intellectual Capital Disclosure (2011, background): “However, existing literature is not consistent since it establishes that not all CEOs are equal nor do they seek the same things because, when they decide to diversify both their objectives and their conduct, they may be aligned differently in accordance with their new activities (Datta et al. 1991;”
Leadership across levels: Levels of leaders and their levels of impact (2010, unknown): “This perspective often shares some similarity to the trait approach, but is distinct in the focus on individuals in the apex of an organization and their effect on strategic processes and outcomes (e.g., Jensen & Zajac, 2004; Nutt, 1987; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996).”
Does a Board Characteristic Moderate the Relationship between CSR Practices and Financial Performance? Evidence from European ESG Firms (2021, methodology): “This measure has been used in several studies, such as those by Datta et al. (1991), Jensen and Zajac (2004), Chau and Gray (2010), and Ammari et al. (2014).”
Do CEOs Matter to Firm Strategic Actions and Firm Performance? A Meta-Analytic Investigation Based on Upper Echelons Theory (2016, background): “…measured the number, size, or expense of the acquisitions by measuring acquisition counts (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012), amount paid for acquisitions (Jensen & Zajac, 2004), revenues of acquired firm relative to revenues of the acquiring firm (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), and number of acquired…”
The Corporate Headquarters in the Contemporary Corporation: Advancing a Multimarket Firm Perspective (2015, background): “For example, CEOs with a finance background are likely to be found in firms that are more diversified and/or are more active acquirers (Jensen & Zajac, 2004; Song, 1982) and those CHQ executives may favor financial over other types of control systems.”
CEO Regulatory Foci, Environmental Dynamism, and Small Firm Performance (2010, background): “…the impact on firm performance, organizational change, strategy, and structure (Cannella, Finkelstein, and Hambrick 2008; Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Hage and Dewar 1973; Jensen and Zajac 2004; Marks and Mirvis 1998a, 1998b; Miller and Droge 1986).”
Toward a Configurational Perspective on the CEO (2016, background): “CEOs who are perceived to have power and who are granted power by others are able to exert more influence via their networks (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).”
How boards’ internal and external social capital interact to affect firm performance (2016, background): “Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the social status perspective (Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Washington and Zajac, 2005) indicate that most organizations aim to recruit people to increase the number of external ties their boards have.”
Upper Echelons Research Revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition (2004, background): “However, mounting evidence suggests that in studying executives collectively, important individual-level effects have been overlooked (e.g.,Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).”
How Lead Founder Personality Affects New Venture Performance (2013, background): “…just on TMT properties but also on the impact of a chief executive’s characteristics and unique position within the TMT (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Jensen & Zajac, 2004; Marcel, 2009) and thus add nuance to the prevalent notion that firm performance is a function of TMT rather than of executive…”