Executive Compensation and Incentives

By M. Conyon. 2006

303 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eaedcecfd4419c7f9079d85fb4b1a9d50ef368a4

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Citations in the corpus

CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, background): “Although calls for reform have reduced the use of stock options as a means of executive compensation, options still constitute a major form of remuneration for executives and have been the major vehicle for CEO pay gains over the past decade or so (Conyon, 2006).”
Does a Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity (2017, background): “, Jensen, 1986), shirking (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Holmstrom, 1979), or too little risk taking (e.g., Gormley and Matsa, 2016; Holmstrom, 1999). In contrast, the question of whether companies face a time-based agency problem—i.e., whether managers’ time preferences are misaligned with”
CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, methodology): “As a result, this optimal contract can reduce Agency Problem I because it encourages CEOs to act on behalf of the shareholders (Conyon, 2006; Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009) and thus aligns the incentives of both parties.”
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective (2019, background): “One of the theories on which board compensation relies is the agency theory, in that the idea is to develop a compensation package that makes it possible to attract, retain and motivate managers (Conyon 2006).”
Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation (2009, background): “Others have argued that Bebchuk and Fried’s conclusion is inappropriate (Conyon, 2006).”
Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment (2010, background): “The reason is that both executive and shareholder return are based on the value of the same underlying asset, company stock (Conyon, 2006).”
Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, unknown): “Further, our findings are consistent with studies demonstrating that executive entrenchment at the full board and compensation committee level does not, of itself, contribute to the uncoupling of CEO pay from firm performance (Conyon, 2006; Dalton et al., 1998; Murphy, 2002).”
6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “& Zenner, 2001; Rose & Wolfram, 2002) but it has had virtually no effect on overall pay levels, as the level of all pay components has increased since 1993 (Conyon, 2006).”
Assessing Managerial Power Theory (2015, background): “Author Year Publication Baber, Kang, and Kumar 1999 AR Baber, Kang, and Liang 2006 WP Baecker 2008 CH Baker, Collins, and Reitenga 2002 WP Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia 2000 AMJ Banning 2004 COC Banning and Chiles 2007 JLR Barro and Barro 1990 JLE Bartkus, Morris, and Seifert 2002 BS Beatty and Z”