Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment
By Anthony J. Nyberg, I. Fulmer, B. Gerhart, Mason A. Carpenter. 2010
295 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/86b1919b3888f43f16304d40d545f70725e3b565
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- A. McKelvie
- Anthony J. Nyberg
- Thomas H. Allison
- C. Trevor
- Dan K. Hsu
- J. Haynie
- Jeremy C. Short
- S. Simmons
In Strategy and Management
- C. Trevor
- Anthony J. Nyberg
- A. McKelvie
- Jenna R. Pieper
- J. Haynie
- B. Gerhart
- S. Simmons
- Jeremy C. Short
Citations in the corpus
- Pay-for-Performance’s Effect on Future Employee Performance (2016, background): “Most employees respond to the entire PFP package rather than to just a single component (Nyberg et al., 2010).”
- Pay for (individual) performance: Issues, claims, evidence and the role of sorting effects (2014, background): “Further, subsequent empirical studies actually find a larger relationship (than found by Jensen & Murphy) between CEO pay and performance (Aggrawal & Samwick, 1999; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Nyberg et al., 2010).”
- Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model (2013, unknown): “Instead, a review of the literature reveals a conflict between: (1) behavioral scholars (as represented by BAM), underlining agents concern with equity wealth losses due to risk taking; and (2) traditional agency scholars representing agents as pre-occupied by the possibilities of gains due to risk ”
- What matters, matters differently: a conjoint analysis of the decision policies of angel and venture capital investors (2014, background): “The literature of agency theory suggests that the agency problem occurs when (1) one party (principal) delegates work to another (agent) (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Nyberg et al. 2010), (2) the goal of the principal conflicts that of the agent (Eisenhardt 1989), and (3) the information asymmetries be”
- Turning Agents into Psychological Principals: Aligning Interests of Non‐Owners Through Psychological Ownership (2013, unknown): “Agent stock ownership is presumed not only to align interests, but also to curb moral hazard, since agent wealth then co-varies with principal wealth (Dalton et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Nyberg et al., 2010).”
- The power of positivity? The influence of positive psychological capital language on crowdfunding performance (2018, methodology): “In these cases, we use an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation: sinh-1(y) = log(yi+(yi(2)+1)) (e.g., Franke and Richey, 2010; Nyberg et al., 2010).”