Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation

By R. Hoskisson, Mark W. Castleton, Michael C. Withers. 2009

149 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6ae87c093ef79953ad70e4f93005f62ddc219809

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Young Kyun Chang
2. Tae-Yeol Kim
3. Won‐yong Oh

In Strategy and Management

1. Tae-Yeol Kim
2. Won‐yong Oh
3. Young Kyun Chang

Citations in the corpus

• Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “Also, a higher level of risk exposure would justify a higher level of compensation (Devers et al., 2007; Hoskisson et al., 2009).”
• Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “However, other scholars have suggested complementarity or compounding effects between incentives and monitoring (Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Hoskisson et al., 2009).”
• Complementary or Substitutive Effects? Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Social Responsibility (2018, background): “A number of researchers (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2009; Schepker & Oh, 2013; Yoshikawa, Zhu, & Wang, 2014) suggest that it may not be reasonable to assume that each governance mechanism functions independently.”