Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have No Incentive Effects

By Paul D. Oyer. 2000

543 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d1bd854428d3230280d6b0760d29070db97ff829

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Citations in the corpus

Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms (2015, unknown): “Oyer (2004) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) show that the participation constraint is important to understanding why there is pay for luck in the time series and why there is broad-based used of employee stock option plans, as outside opportunities may co-vary with the market.”
Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices (2014, background): “In a competitive labor market, firms would adjust the compensation of the CEO to that of others in the industry (Oyer, 2004).”
Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options (2010, unknown): “Further, if the firm's stock price performance is linked to employees' outside employment alternatives, this automatic compensation adjustment would serve to retain employees who might otherwise pursue opportunities outside the firm (Oyer (2004)).”
Corporate Financing Decisions When Investors Take the Path of Least Resistance (2007, unknown): “In particular, there is a continuum of A-specialists who have values of E(D) uniformly distributed on the interval [F, F + H], where the parameter H can be interpreted as a measure of the divergence of opinion.”
Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, background): “Oyer (2004) replies that if the employee’s outside option (u, in our model above) is correlated with industry-wide share prices, then arrangements that look like pay-for-luck can be part of an optimal employment contract.”
Non-commercial Research and Educational Use including without Limitation Use in Instruction at Your Institution, Sending It to Specific Colleagues That You Know, and Providing a Copy to Your Institution's Administrator. All Other Uses, Reproduction and Distribution, including without Limitation Comm (2005, unknown): “In an initial step the values of all parameters are set to random values between lower and upper limits which are chosen by the user.”
CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework (2013, unknown): “For example, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) and Frydman (2005) have used the hypothesis that general managerial skills have increased in importance relative to firm-specific skills to understand the rise in CEO pay over time.”
Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation (2009, unknown): “The other effect is that industry peer performance captures shocks to demand for managerial talent that drive up CEO pay (see Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000; Oyer, 2004): its coefficient should therefore be positive.”
Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, unknown): “For example, Oyer (2004) shows that some awards are given for retention purposes.”
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, methodology): “We then provide alternative tests checks using the arguably more precise, 10K-text-based industry classifications of Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) (HP). Albuquerque (2009) shows that splitting industries in size groups makes finding RPE easier in the data.”
The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation (2017, background): “A number of theoretical contributions emphasize the relevance of the participation constraint for compensation contracts, but empirical inferences on this constraint are only indirect (see Oyer, 2004; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2009).”
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation (2008, unknown): “A simple example of CEO retention and pay for luck To provide some structure for the empirical tests, we develop a simple example that is similar in spirit to Oyer (2004). In our extension of Oyer’s model, we show that not only do firms tie pay to firm performance for retention purposes but also tha”
Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans ☆ (2009, unknown): “compensation, in attracting and retaining employees in tight labor markets? Oyer’s (2004) wage indexation theory suggests that stock options are more likely to be effective at employee retention in tight labor markets relative to other modes of compensation.”
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006, methodology): “A related approach suggested by Oyer (2004) and Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) focuses on the managers’ threat of quitting not only ex ante (as in the traditional principal-agent model), but also ex post, after performance has been observed.”