Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms

By Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison G. Hong, Jose A. Scheinkman. 2015

244 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b33181208d2277e9dd39301eac61b07852d8ec1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Tim King
2. Jonathan M. Williams
3. E. Wu
4. Abhishek Srivastav

In Finance

1. Tim King
2. Muhammad Saifuddin Khan
3. Jonathan M. Williams
4. Harald Scheule
5. E. Wu
6. Abhishek Srivastav

Citations in the corpus

• What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, background): “Cheng et al. (2015) argue that excessive CEO pay increases banks’ exposure to riskier activities like mortgage-backed-securities and increases the volatility of returns.”
• Funding liquidity and bank risk taking (2017, background): “In a related vein, Cheng et al. (2015) show that based on classical principal-agent theory, risk-averse managers require higher compensation levels to work in riskier financial firms as they face greater uncertainty in their wealth.”
• Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “…and Naveen (2006) document a positive one, and Garen (1994), Yermack (1995), Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1996), Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), Conyon and Murphy (2000), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), and Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2015) show either no relationship or mixed results.”