Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices

By Martijn Cremers, Yaniv Grinstein. 2014

139 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/49551432ee62844f367821f13615e5c997ec8f75

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Citations in the corpus

Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital (2013, unknown): “We repeat our analyses in Tables 7 and 8 by replacing industry homogeneity (HOMOG) with the industry percentage of internal CEO successors (see Table 3 in Cremers and Grinstein (2011)).”
Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “…of insider succession 5 exists in listed firms indicating that assuming a tournament scenario for the CEO position among VPs is plausible: Cremers and Grinstein (2014) document a 71% probability of insider succession between 1993 and 2005 in US firms with only modest variation across…”
China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk (2018, background): “Managers have better mobility in their employment with more external hiring opportunities (Cremers and Grinstein, 2014; Gao, Luo and Tang, 2015).”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “public rms are promoted from within the rm, suggesting that rm-specic human capital or other frictions disadvantage outside candidates (Parrino, 1997; Cremers and Grinstein, 2014).”
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management (2016, background): “As documented in Cremers and Grinstein (2011), 68.6 percent of CEOs are promoted within the firm; in other words, in 68.6 percent of the CEO turnover cases, one of the key subordinate executives becomes the next CEO.10 As the potential CEO in the future, these subordinate executives care about the…”