Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation

By Ana Albuquerque. 2009

329 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d032d478e092a65092ecb11d4d5501dd40126db0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. David F. Larcker
2. Daniel J. Taylor
3. Gaizka Ormazabal
4. Antonio Dávila
5. Eun-Hee Kim
6. Thomas P. Lyon
7. Ian D. Gow
8. Christopher S. Armstrong

In Strategy and Management

1. Daniel J. Taylor
2. Eun-Hee Kim
3. David F. Larcker
4. Gaizka Ormazabal
5. Thomas P. Lyon
6. Javier Arellano
7. Antonio Dávila
8. Carmen Aranda

Citations in the corpus

• Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure (2015, methodology): “Empirically, we test these ideas using absolute growth and profits variables for each firm, and we conduct robustness checks using various relative measures (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999, King and Lenox 2000, Bizjak et al. 2008, Albuquerque 2009).”
• Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation (2012, neutral): “As Albuquerque (2009) points out, the size of a firm is an important determinant of its exposure to external shocks.”
• Search Based Peer Firms: Aggregating Investor Perceptions through Internet Co-Searches (2015, neutral): “Albuquerque, 2009).”
• The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation (2010, positive): “In addition, prior work suggests the primary determinant of CEO pay is the pay of the firm’s size and industry peers (e.g., Albuquerque, 2009; Albuquerque, De Franco, and Verdi, 2009) and that the popular press uses size and industry benchmarks when judging excess pay (e.g., Core, Guay, and…”
• Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2011, neutral): “2009b; Albuquerque et al. 2009). Bizjak et al. (2009) and Faulkender and Yang (2009) show that firms select highly paid peers to justify excess CEO compensation, but Cadman et al.”
• Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, neutral): “This is consistent with the findings in Albuquerque (2009), who shows that industry-size peer groups capture similarity in firms’ economic shocks.”
• Organizational Learning in Target Setting (2017, background): “Vicarious learning is enhanced when the units are more comparable (Albuquerque, 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007).”