Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives

By Paul D. Oyer, Scott Schaefer. 2010

289 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e73ec3f7494b4c85e3f3ff00da6f0de78af51644

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Citations in the corpus

Social Networks, Employee Selection, and Labor Market Outcomes (2016, methodology): “Recent research within personnel economics has drawn the attention to the various strategies employed by firms to overcome this information problem (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011). In this paper we provide an in-depth empirical analysis of the hypothesis that firms use social networks when selecting emplo”
Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market (2011, background): “A study of the wage rises at San Francisco airport (Reich et al., 2005) report a similar elasticity for one occupational group but two of the others are at 1.4 and one is at 0.25. Furthermore, Brenner (2005) reports an insignificant “wrongly-signed” elasticity, as do Dube et al.”
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives (2015, unknown): “[49] Oyer, Paul and Schaefer, Scott 2010 "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives" forthcoming in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol.”
The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance (2019, background): “To look at these effects we must first confront the key empirical barrier associated with studying civil servants – the lack of reliable individual performance measures (Oyer and Schaefer 2010).”
Field experiments in labor economics (2010, background): “The practical importance of substitution bias is provided in Puma et al. (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1995).”
Discretion in Hiring Mitchell (2015, unknown): “[21] Oyer, Paul and Scott Schaefer (2011), “Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives,” in the Handbook of Labor Economics, 4B, eds.”
Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking (2014, background): “20 Indeed, some research has suggested that such a question is unanswerable: ‘ . . . it seems unlikely that economic research will ever tell us exactly where the typical CEO pay arrangement lies on the spectrum from completely inefficient to completely optimal’ (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011:18).”
Boarding a Sinking Ship? An Investigation of Job Applications to Distressed Firms (2016, background): “Finally, while employee job search has been well-studied, much less is known about firms’ search for employees (Oyer and Schaefer 2011).”
Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies (2014, unknown): “We do not know whether or why certain types of CEOs are hired in specific situations or, more generally, the sources (if any) of match-specific productivity (see Oyer and Schaefer, 2011).”
No Margin, no Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for public service delivery (2014, background): “…D82 Keywords: financial incentives, non-monetary rewards, pro-social motivation, public service delivery ∗Ashraf: HBS and NBER, nashraf@hbs.edu; Bandiera: Department of Economics and STICERD, LSE, o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk; Jack: Department of Economics, Tufts University and NBER, kelsey.jack@tufts.edu.”