CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework

By Andrea L. Eisfeldt, Camelia M. Kuhnen. 2013

332 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bd243854aa2c749251ee3edb60331578316c18e2

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In Accounting

1. Iftekhar Hasan
2. Bill Francis
3. Qiang Wu
4. Florens Focke
5. Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
6. Michael S. Weisbach
7. Florian S. Peters
8. T. Y. Wang

In Finance

1. Florens Focke
2. Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
3. Michael S. Weisbach
4. Florian S. Peters
5. Iftekhar Hasan
6. Alexander F. Wagner
7. Ernst Maug
8. Bill Francis

In Strategy and Management

1. Michael S. Weisbach
2. Florian S. Peters
3. Iftekhar Hasan
4. Alexander F. Wagner
5. Ernst Maug
6. Bill Francis
7. Qiang Wu
8. Murillo Campello

Citations in the corpus

• Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies (2014, unknown): “4 This finding is consistent with the generalized model by Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013), who link CEO turnover in firms hit by a negative shock to deterioration of the quality in firm-CEO matches. view,” appointing a financial expert CEO could be the cheapest way to implement a given strategy, either…”
• The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, unknown): “Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) present competitive assignment models of the managerial labor market, absent an agency problem.”
• The Executive Turnover Risk Premium (2014, background): “While this empirical fact is puzzling from the perspective of standard models of relative performance evaluation, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) provide a competitive assignment model in which industry shocks change the outside options of firms and managers, making it optimal for boards to include…”
• Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Professors in the Boardroom (2014, methodology): “Then following Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) criteria, we classify CEO turnover in to exogenous turnover, unclassified 30 turnover and forced turnover by searching business website news.”
• A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas (2013, unknown): “Although it is inherently difficult to classify if a separation was forced or voluntary (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 2010), we were able to use firms’ disclosures and press accounts to verify 15 cases in which the CEO left the firm for reasons unrelated to firm performance, such as a bona fide illness,…”
• The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation (2017, background): “…on executive compensation has made significant progress on this question in recent years, for example by analyzing the market for CEO talent (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013)), or by identifying the importance of corporate governance as a factor that explains pay levels (Hartzell and Starks,…”