Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation

By John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon, L. Naveen. 2008

494 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01d362270ac7b40ed2859aaff6288eb4ba8ec391

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Citations in the corpus

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation (2012, unknown): “exposure to common exogenous shocks, and therefore, of peer choice (Bizjak et al. [2008],”
Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy (2014, unknown): “Finally, column (6) examines peer groups defined by size groups within each threedigit SIC code (e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) and Byrd, Johnson, and Porter (1998)).”
Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, unknown): “Moreover, peer groups tend to be comprised of firms of similar size from the same industry (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010), and Bizjak, Lemmon and Nguyen (2010)).”
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, unknown): “…Faulkender and Yang (2010), we regress CEO pay at a disclosing firm on the median CEO pay of its compensation peer companies and factors previously documented to affect the level of CEO compensation, including the median CEO pay of the firm’s industry-size peers (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen 2008).”
CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect (2009, unknown): “It is well known that firms commonly disclose an intention to pay well; Bizjak et al. (2008) report that 73 out of 100 randomly selected firms “mention targeting at least one component of pay at or above the peer group median or mean.””
Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups (2010, background): “One common practice of the compensation committee is to benchmark pay levels against other companies with whom the ﬁrm competes for talent (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008).”
Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “Consistent with this argument, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) study the effect of peer choice on pay and provide support for the idea that peer pay serves to gauge the market wage necessary to retain valuable human capital.”
Executive Compensation and Incentives (2006, background): “Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) concluded that peer-group selection is a “practical and efficient mechanism” to determine the market wage for executives and that it is not indicative of manipulation for personal gain.26 However, Faulkender and Yang (2010) found that companies include unrelated…”
Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure (2015, methodology): “Empirically, we test these ideas using absolute growth and profits variables for each firm, and we conduct robustness checks using various relative measures (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999, King and Lenox 2000, Bizjak et al. 2008, Albuquerque 2009).”