Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options

By Yael V. Hochberg, L. Lindsey. 2010

208 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8f97978b762c837573443b19d2baaf30cb4e665

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Ronald W. Masulis
2. V. Atanasov
3. Feixue Xie
4. Cong Wang
5. E. Trahan
6. Bernard S. Black
7. O. Faleye
8. Jarrad Harford

In Finance

1. V. Atanasov
2. Feixue Xie
3. Cong Wang
4. Bernard S. Black
5. E. Trahan
6. Ronald W. Masulis
7. O. Faleye
8. Jarrad Harford

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. E. Trahan
2. Cong Wang
3. Ronald W. Masulis
4. Feixue Xie
5. O. Faleye

Citations in the corpus

• Globalizing the Boardroom - The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2012, background): “See, e.g., Kedia and Rajgopal (2009), Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2010), and Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2011).”
• Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, background): “Consider, for example, Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), who use what we saw as the best geography-based instrument in our sample.”
• Rank and File Employees and the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options (2016, unknown): “Prior work shows that rank and file stock option awards sort and retain employees, address local labor market competition (Oyer, 2004; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Bergman and Jenter, 2007; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009), and align the incentives of employees and shareholders (Hochberg and Lindsey, 2010).”
• Labor-Friendly Corporate Practices: Is What is Good for Employees Good for Shareholders? (2011, methodology): “Using these data and following the methodology of Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), we calculate non-executive employee compensation incentives as the change in the value of aggregate non-executive employee option portfolio for a $1 change in the firm’s stock price divided by the number of employees.”
• Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership: Motives and Outcomes: Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership (2014, unknown): “Employee compensation 4 The difference between numerous and not-so-numerous-employee firms is consistent with Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), who find the positive relation between broad-based stock option plans and performance is confined to small employee firms. is analyzed in Section III.”