Determinants of Incentive Intensity in Group-Based Rewards

By Todd R. Zenger, Catherine Marshall. 2000

170 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4e0e92096ab3ba0af299d19e734921301890c017

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Citations in the corpus

Team‐based reward allocation structures and the helping behaviors of outcome‐interdependent team members (2009, background): “Incentive intensity, or the overall magnitude of the incentive as a proportion of total pay (Zenger and Marshall, 2000), may be significant in that different modes of group-based reward allocation may have more or less of an impact on member helping depending upon the extent to which team members vi”
Do you get what you pay for? Sales incentives and implications for motivation and changes in turnover intention and work effort (2016, background): “For this reason, many past studies have actually operationalized instrumentality as the proportion of PFP in an individual’s pay package (Zenger and Marshall 2000).”
Effort, Performance, and Conscientiousness: An Agency Theory Perspective (2007, background): “In addition, Zenger and Marshall (2000) noted that when there is a physical or psychological cost, the agent will choose a level of “effort” where marginal gains equal marginal costs.”
Entrepreneurial Finance Meets Organizational Reality: Comparing Investment Practices and Performance of Corporate and Independent Venture Capitalists (2010, unknown): “In practice, prior work employs various measures, ranging from a simple sum of dollar value to a sophisticated discounting of stock options (Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993; Balkin et al., 2000; Zenger and Marshall, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2002).”
Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment (2010, unknown): “We tested our hypotheses by estimating our model on subsets of the facilities about which we hypothesized, an approach used by many other organizational scholars (e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Zenger and Marshall, 2000; Simon, 2005; Xiao and Tsui, 2007) and in program evaluations of voluntary ”
Relationships Between Work Team Climate, Individual Motivation, and Creativity (2018, methodology): “Consistent with prior research that measures pay mix as a ratio (Zenger & Marshall, 2000), team reward structure was assessed with a single item reported by the manager: “In my team, [a number between 1 and 100]% of compensation is determined by individual performance, and [a number between 1and…”
Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking (2014, background): “Prior research shows that firms may strategically reduce the strength of incentives in order to mitigate multitasking distortions such as those seen here (Baker, 1992; Zenger and Marshall, 2000).”
Beyond Simple Utility: Incentive Design and Trade–Offs for Corporate Employee–Entrepreneurs (2010, background): “…individual vs. group vs. organization level rewards (Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, & Wiseman, 2000; Jones & Butler; Lawler, 2000), incentive intensity (Zenger & Marshal, 2000), other nonfinancial and intrinsic sources of motivation (Block & MacMillan; Kuratko et al., 1997; Schwartz, 1978; Sykes,…”