Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*

By Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth. 2013

220 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. We find conditions under which a stable matching exists with high probability in large markets. We present a mechanism that finds a stable matching with high probability, and which makes truth-telling by all participants an approximate equilibrium. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/afa8131729a801295655f02e9301095f4a99bada

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Gender Studies

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “It would have been equivalent to start with preferences over sets of students that were responsive to the preferences over students, as in Roth (1985). 18This assumption is without loss of generality.”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “We begin with DA-STB.”
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India (2019, unknown): “It would be an interesting theoretical exercise to formalize this intuition in the future, along the lines of the analysis of the heuristic for accommodating couples in the NRMP; see Kojima et al. (2013) and Ashlagi et al. (2014).”