COURSE BIDDING AT BUSINESS SCHOOLS

By Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver. 2010

219 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/936e62c75836243883692617b33cc388cc2cf84d

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Citations in the corpus

Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, background): “A classical resource allocation problem with multi-unit demand has attracted renewed attention in the context of practical course allocation at business schools as studied by Sönmez and Ünver (2010), Budish and Cantillon (2010), and Budish (2010).”
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, background): “This is the reason the assignment problem is called “combinatorial” as opposed to the multiunit assignment problem studied by Sönmez and Ünver (2003, 2010) and Budish and Cantillon (forthcoming).”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties.”
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds (2011, methodology): “In Appendix A, we provide a simpler and more intuitive algorithm for ﬁnding such an assignment that we call the deferred acceptance algorithm with ﬁxed type allotments ( DAAFTA ) We also show how DAAFTA followed by SEA works in Appendix A”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “The characterization theorem is as follows: Theorem 8 (Sönmez and Ünver 2010b) A mechanism is coalitionally strategy-proof, individually rational, Pareto-effi cient, weakly neutral, and consistent if and only if it is equivalent to a YRMH-IGYT mechanism.”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, methodology): “We state the following theorem whose proof is an extension of the proof of the standard Birkhoff (1946) - von Neumann (1953) Theorem (also see Kojima and Manea (2010)):”
Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, background): “…recent applications of market design include school choice, kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007), Ünver (2010)), course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver (2010), Budish and Cantillon (2012)), and internet ad auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007), Varian (2007)).”
AXIOMS FOR DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE (2010, background): “The first version of this result, for a slightly different context, appears in Sönmez and Ünver (2009). The present statement is due to Hatfield and Kojima (2008). (3)When priorities are substitutable, the core coincides with the set of stable allocations.”