Appendix to "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets"

By Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak. 2009

199 citations recorded by the source corpus.

A Appendix A: Additional results 3 A.1 Manipulation via pre-arranged matches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 A.2 Manipulation via capacities and pre-arranged matches without sufficient thickness 4 A.3 Examples of sufficiently thick markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A.4 Equilibrium analysis with incomplete information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A.5 Weakening distributional assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A.6 Pre-arrangement in a sufficiently thick market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.7 Manipulations by coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.8 Manipulating the Boston mechanism in large markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cfd62fbe535e31ce0a18d34eb52f33f39bca626f

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Yeon-Koo Che
2. Fuhito Kojima
3. Lars Ehlers
4. Ariel D. Procaccia
5. Vincent Conitzer
6. Isa Emin Hafalir
7. M. Bumin Yenmez
8. Muhammed A. Yıldırım

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Yeon-Koo Che
2. Fuhito Kojima
3. Lars Ehlers
4. Felix Brandt
5. Ariel D. Procaccia
6. Vincent Conitzer
7. Isa Emin Hafalir
8. M. Bumin Yenmez

Citations in the corpus

• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008, methodology): “deferred acceptance algorithm in two-sided matching ( Kojima and Pathak (2008) ) and the”
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “Since then, various articles have provided theoretical explanations for this phenomenon for large population instances of smi or hr (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2014).”
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds (2011, background): “…formally, given S (cid:4) ⊆ S , let H c (S (cid:4) , ˜ q c ,( ˜ q tc ) t ∈ T ) be the largest subset of S (with respect to set inclusion) that includes the highest ranked students in S according to (cid:5) c such that there are no more than ˜ q c students in total and ˜ q tc students of type t .”