H. Krambeck
Sociology and Political Science · 2002–2010
A researcher in the Science corpus: 5 papers; trusts 12 researchers and is trusted by 10 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Sociology and Political Science — 35 citations into it; #4,563 of 22,756 by trust here, #1,665 by citations
- Safety Research — 26 citations into it; #1,050 of 5,829 by trust here, #383 by citations
- Experimental and Cognitive Psychology — 12 citations into it; #8,075 of 9,731 by trust here, #7,727 by citations
- Management Science and Operations Research — 9 citations into it; #4,923 of 11,946 by trust here, #1,222 by citations
Whom H. Krambeck trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Martin A. Nowak
- Ernst Fehr
- M. Milinski
- Herbert Gintis
- Dirk Semmann
- Simon Gächter
- Robert Trivers
- Karl Sigmund
- C. Hauert
- Urs Fischbacher
Who trusts H. Krambeck overall
- David G. Rand
- Pat Barclay
- Dirk Semmann
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Matjaz Perc
- T. Bereczkei
- Robb Willer
- Martin A. Nowak
Papers from H. Krambeck's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers H. Krambeck trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
- The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
- Altruistic punishment in humans (Nature)
- Cooperation through image scoring in humans. (Science)
- Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games
- Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (Social Science Research Network)
- Costly signaling and cooperation. (Journal of Theoretical Biology)
- Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity (Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences)
- Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. (Physical Review Letters)
- Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Nature)
Their papers
- Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (2002) — 1,371 citations
- Strategic investment in reputation (2004) — 120 citations
- Human strategy updating in evolutionary games (2010) — 398 citations
- The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change (2008) — 620 citations
- Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group (2005) — 152 citations