Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
By Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter. Social Science Research Network, 2000
4,444 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/475819d6223c13c466d20a80ddced737da5bf347
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Ernst Fehr
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- David G. Rand
- Herbert Gintis
- Colin F. Camerer
- Ernesto Reuben
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Simon Gächter
- John A. List
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- David G. Rand
- Urs Fischbacher
- Armin Falk
In Sociology and Political Science
- Ernst Fehr
- David G. Rand
- Joseph Henrich
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Simon Gächter
- Pat Barclay
- Urs Fischbacher
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
Citations in the corpus
- Psychological foundations of incentives (2001, background): “Since Fehr and GQ achter (2000b) were also interested in the impact of the framing of incentives they conducted an additional treatment in which the incentive was described as a bonus payment, i.”
- Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving (2014, neutral): “[7] Fehr, E.”
- Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism (2006, background): “Fehr and Gächter (2000b) interpret the evidence as suggesting that substantial numbers of individuals have a propensity to punish free riding, perhaps because it violates a norm of, or a predisposition towards, reciprocity.”
- The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market (2010, neutral): “5 In a separate paper using MTurk, Horton and Chilton (2010) explored whether a simple rational model can explain worker output.”
- Conducting interactive experiments online (2017, neutral): “We base our discussion of online and laboratory experiments on a well-established paradigm: a public goods game with and without punishment (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000, 2002).”
- Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments (2005, methodology): “2 In this experiment we try to obtain a data-driven classification that is not dependent on any specific theoretical model,3 by combining four sources of evidence: the ‘Strategy Method’ used by Fischbacher et al. (2001), the ‘Decomposed Game Technique’ used by Offerman et al.”
- Inequity aversion improves cooperation in intertemporal social dilemmas (2018, background): “enerates cooperation in a grossly ineffi- cient manner: huge amounts of collective resource are lost to fines (compare Figures 4D and 4E). This parallels human behavior in laboratory matrix games, e.g. [56, 57]. In the Cleanup game, advantageous-inequity averse agents resolve the social dilemma withou”
- Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis (2007, background): “Scholars are now positing a family of individual models that change the basic assumptions of the classical model (see Rabin, 1993; Ito, Saijo, and Une, 1995; Chan et al., 1997; Levine, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Gintis, 2000; Casari and Plott, 2003; Cox, 2004).”
- A Burden of Responsibility: The Role of Social Approval at the Onset of a Crisis (2014, background): “…breaking point, compelling evaluators to enact “durable changes to the rules” and to punish a lower-approval organization for its repeated failures (Ballinger & Rockmann, 2010: 374; Braithwaite, 1989; Davidson, Worrell, & Lee, 1994; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008).”