Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments

By Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter. Social Science Research Network, 2000

4,444 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/475819d6223c13c466d20a80ddced737da5bf347

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
  3. Ananish Chaudhuri
  4. Nikos Nikiforakis
  5. David G. Rand
  6. Herbert Gintis
  7. Colin F. Camerer
  8. Ernesto Reuben

In Safety Research

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Ananish Chaudhuri
  3. Simon Gächter
  4. John A. List
  5. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
  6. David G. Rand
  7. Urs Fischbacher
  8. Armin Falk

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. David G. Rand
  3. Joseph Henrich
  4. Ananish Chaudhuri
  5. Simon Gächter
  6. Pat Barclay
  7. Urs Fischbacher
  8. Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Citations in the corpus