Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
By M. Milinski, Dirk Semmann, H. Krambeck. Nature, 2002
1,371 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/454373b55429576310322a26e8b71cf30fa7e444
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Matjaz Perc
- Pat Barclay
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Attila Szolnoki
- David G. Rand
- Zhen Wang
- Robb Willer
- Ernst Fehr
In Safety Research
- Pat Barclay
- David G. Rand
- Matjaz Perc
- Ernst Fehr
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Attila Szolnoki
- Daniel Balliet
- T. Yamagishi
In Sociology and Political Science
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Pat Barclay
- David G. Rand
- Ernst Fehr
- Zhen Wang
- Daniel Balliet
- T. Yamagishi
Citations in the corpus
- Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior (2008, background): “This created an incentive for egoists to develop a reputation for being prosocial in the public behavior condition, as greater giving in phase one could elicit greater receiving in phase two (Milinski et al. 2002a; 2002b).”
- The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “A very elegant experiment shows that this tendency for third-party rewarding can be harnessed to avert the tragedy of the commons in a repeated public goods game (Milinski et al., 2002).”
- Equitable decision making is associated with neural markers of intrinsic value (2011, background): “Consistent with this account, magnifying the salience of extrinsic motivators, such as the possibility of punishment or the importance of reputation, drastically increases overt displays of fairness (1, 6).”
- Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the ''tragedy of the commons'' (2004, background): “Supporting this, Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck (2002) had participants play an experimental game where they alternated between the opportunity to donate money to other players (an indirect reciprocity game from Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) or the opportunity to donate to a public good.”
- Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans (2013, background): “This modulation of behavior could be strategic, as it was in studies where participants modulated their cooperation within an experiment according to their anonymity in a particular round (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Milinski et al., 2002b; Semmann et al., 2004).”
- Strategic investment in reputation (2004, background): “…studies confirmed that human subjects who have been helpful in the past are more likely to receive help from others through indirect reciprocity (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Bolton et al. 2001; Milinski et al. 2001; Seinen and Schram 2001; Milinski et al. 2002a; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002).”
- A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change (2009, background): “…for being trustworthy and reciprocating the efforts of others to cooperate with their own cooperation turns out to be a central characteristic of settings where moderate to high levels of cooperation are sustained (Milinski et al., 2002; Rothstein, 2005; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom, forthcoming).”
- Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “Indeed, while the majority of previous studies addressing the ‘‘stick versus carrot’’ dilemma concluded that punishment is more effective than reward in sustaining cooperation [67], evidence suggesting that rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead to higher total earnings without potential”