The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change

By M. Milinski, R. Sommerfeld, H. Krambeck, F. A. Reed, Jochem Marotzke. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2008

620 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b666ba9a27315684a4996934fae5fa7e87af5d6

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Citations in the corpus

Framing Climate Change: Economics, Ideology, and Uncertainty in American News Media Content From 1988 to 2014 (2019, background): “Importantly, the prospect of severe loss has been found to motivate people to engage in collective action in social dilemma situations (Milinski et al., 2008; Dannenberg et al., 2015; Farjam et al., 2018), but people tend to underestimate risks associated with climate change because they are abstrac”
The Psychology of Environmental Decisions (2014, methodology): “(141) utilized an experimental game that was explicitly designed to model climate change as a kind of threshold public goods dilemma.”
Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, neutral): “…and biochemical systems (Frick and Schuster, 2003; Pfeiffer and Schuster, 2005; Chettaoui et al., 2007; Schuster et al., 2008), to traffic congestion (Helbing et al., 2005; Perc, 2007a) and climate change (Milinski et al., 2006; Pfeiffer and Nowak, 2006; Milinski et al., 2008), to name but a few.”
Effects of Goal Framing and Emotions on Perceived Threat and Willingness to Sacrifice for Climate Change (2017, background): “A more realistic option to stress gains of climate engagement is to point out that climate protection will lead to a maintenance of the status quo (Milinski et al., 2008), which currently represents the best possible outcome.”
On the Provision of Public Goods with Probabilistic and Ambiguous Thresholds (2015, background): “Before round 1 and round 6, players could make non-binding proposals for what the group as a whole should contribute to avoid the public bad.4 This basic design and the chosen parameters closely follow Milinski et al. (2008) and Tavoni et al. (2011).”
Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions (2010, neutral): “For illustration, one may imagine that cooperators (C) correspond to countries trying to meet the CO2 emission standards of the Kyoto protocol [24], and ‘‘moralists’’ (M) to cooperative countries that addition-”