Costly signaling and cooperation.

By Herbert Gintis, E. Smith, Samuel Bowles. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2001

835 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f8a94c019953cad42d2ef75a9321aab06ce29a2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Pat Barclay
2. Joseph Henrich
3. Ernst Fehr
4. Michael Gurven
5. C. Schaik
6. Urs Fischbacher
7. E. Smith
8. Peter M. Kappeler

In Safety Research

1. Pat Barclay
2. Joseph Henrich
3. Ernst Fehr
4. Urs Fischbacher
5. Herbert Gintis
6. Samuel Bowles
7. Peter M. Kappeler
8. C. Schaik

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Joseph Henrich
2. Pat Barclay
3. Ernst Fehr
4. Michael Gurven
5. Urs Fischbacher
6. Dominic D. P. Johnson
7. Herbert Gintis
8. C. Schaik

Citations in the corpus

• Strategic investment in reputation (2004, background): “2001; Fehr and G chter 2002), costly signalling with altruistic acts (Gintis et al. 2001), voluntary participation in the public goods game (Hauert et al.”
• Signaling can increase consumers' willingness to pay for green products. Theoretical model and experimental evidence (2019, neutral): “The reason for this is that potential allies tend to infer that the signaler may also extend their benevolence to them, so public pro-social behavior could be an even more efficient way of investing in social capital (i.e., bonding) than pure status signaling (Gintis et al., 2001).”
• The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters (2003, background): “It may also be the case that receiver preferences for signals that provide not only information benefits but also material benefits (such as feast foods) may favor the evolution of signaling systems that provide such benefits (Gintis et al., 2001).”
• The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations (2004, background): “Also, those engaging in punishment of norm violators may reap fitness benefits if their punishment is treated as a costly signal of some underlying but unobservable quality as a mate, coalition partner, or opponent (Gintis et al., 2001).”
• Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans (2013, background): “Audience members benefit from attending to public generosity because it can convey information about the giver's abilities, resources, or cooperative intent (Gintis et al., 2001, see also Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997).”
• Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007, background): “The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics (e.g., Boone, 1998; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Gurven, 2004; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2003; Roberts, 1998).”
• “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005, background): “We found, first, that the canonical model—based on pure self-interest—fails in all of the societies studied.”
• Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans (2011, background): “This is for instance the case with direct reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), indirect reciprocity (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004), punishment (Gardner & West, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 2001), group augmentation (Kokko et al., 2001), and costly signalling (Gintis et al., 2001).”